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i 
Foreword 
 
Helen Sampson  
 
 
 
The Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) is an essentially policy-related 
Centre which undertakes research on the human and organisational aspects of the 
shipping industry. As such, staff at the Centre have interests in industry regulation, 
systems of education and training, human resource management, the management of 
risk, the context within which seafarer and vessel casualties occur, health and welfare 
issues, industrial relations, and work processes.  The Centre’s success is built upon the 
support of key stakeholders within the maritime ‘community’. Across the sector 
organisations  have: commissioned projects; provided ‘core-funding’ for the Centre; 
facilitated research access; and provided funding for events such as this which, in 
2009, has been generously supported by the Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust to 
which we are grateful. Such on-going collaboration suggests a keen interest within the 
sector in attaining a deeper insight into some of the issues relating to the organisation 
and functioning of the shipping industry. 
 
 The SIRC Symposium is held every two-years with the intention of feeding back our 
findings to those across the sector who may find them of interest, and use, in forming 
policy, in reaching decisions about strategy, and in considering operational matters. 
The Symposium attracts an audience from a wide range of organisations. Not 
everyone who attends will share a similar perspective. Some organisations are 
primarily focussed upon seafarers’ welfare, some upon safety, some upon the 
competitive operation of ships, some upon the representation of seafarers, and some 
upon the regulation of the sector. Whatever the reason for taking an interest in our 
work, however, we hope that the papers presented will be of use, and that our research 
might impact, if only in small ways, upon the improvement of policies and practices 
in the industry, most particularly those which effect seafarers’ health, safety and 
welfare. 
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Introduction to Day One 
 
Helen Sampson  
 
 
 
Three papers are presented in this, the first, session of the 2009 SIRC Symposium. 
Two of these relate to work that has been funded by the Lloyd’s Register Educational 
Trust and one is the product of the individual work of one of our senior Nippon 
Foundation Fellows – Capt Mohamed Ghanem1.  
 
In the first paper of the day, Professor Michael Bloor presents some findings that have 
emerged from our efforts to gather data relating to seafarer injuries from Maritime 
Administrations. The paper demonstrates that the data collected by Maritime 
Administrations are highly variable and in most cases are not found to be directly 
comparable. It further illustrates the extent to which it is possible to demonstrate that 
the under-reporting, or under-recording, of injuries is  widespread across the industry 
and that as a result of variations in recording/reporting practices even such trends as 
are identified by social researchers (for example what appear, on the surface, to be 
statistically significant differences in the injury rates of seafarers of different 
nationality), could well be artefacts of the reporting/recording system rather than a 
reflection of ‘real’ differences in casualty rates. The paper is a reminder of the need 
for more robust systems of data collection to be put in place by organisations, such as 
the IMO, which have already established some requirements for the recording and 
collation of information with regard to serious incidents at sea. The usefulness of 
current requirements aimed at establishing intelligence regarding injury rates in the 
industry is severely limited by the prevalence of variable recording practices. These 
render the aggregation of industry-wide data virtually meaningless. Furthermore the 
calculation of both injury, and fatality rates, is hampered by an absence of evidence 
                                                 
1 SIRC has been awarded a grant by the Nippon Foundation to support people with a social science or a 
maritime -related background (including former seafarers) through a programme of post-graduate level 
research which has the potential to culminate in the award of a PhD. The objective of the funding is to 
support the development of an international network of social scientists focussing on ‘human-related’ 
work in the maritime sector. There are currently eighteen SIRC-Nippon Foundation fellows based 
within the Seafarers International Research Centre and four alumni from the programme. For further 
details of their backgrounds and research please visit the SIRC-Nippon Foundation Fellowships 
website at www.sirc.cf.ac.uk -> Nippon Fellows. 
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relating to the numbers of seafarers employed on vessels registered with particular 
maritime administrations. This absence of data makes it impossible to calculate injury 
or fatality rates with any semblance of accuracy and forces researchers to rely on 
estimates and patchy information in making even rough calculations. Given that 
Maritime Administrations are already tasked, by the IMO, with collecting data on 
serious incidents at sea it seems particularly regrettable that the additional steps which 
are required to facilitate the production of robust and reliable casualty rates for the 
industry have not, so far, been taken. Such steps could be of a relatively simple nature 
involving guidance about recording in terms of what information should be recorded, 
and in relation to which types of incidents, and instruction as to the categorisation of 
data to facilitate uniformity, and thus comparability. 
 
The second paper of the session is also concerned, indirectly, with injuries and  
fatalities. However, in this case the focus is on their prevention rather than on 
identification. Since the inception of the Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Research 
Unit at the Seafarers International Research Centre we have been engaged in a project 
relating to the ways in which risk is seen by the employees of ship operators. The 
first, major, phase of this study entailed the administration and analysis of a large 
scale questionnaire which revealed that significant differences in perception were 
prevalent amongst different groups of employees. These were identified between 
different ranks/positions, between different nationalities and between different 
departments and many of the findings were reported at the last symposium. In the 
paper presented by Dr Nicholas Bailey to the 2009 symposium such differences are 
further explored. The paper sheds light on why it might be that despite company 
efforts to effect change in perceptions of risk, parts of the industry workforce remain 
strongly resistant to corporate messages about safety and about risk in relation to 
working practices. It illustrates the impact upon seafarers of personal (and second 
hand) involvement in real accidents and reveals how such experiences have far greater 
meaning for employees than injury or fatality data presented in statistical/tabulated 
form. The paper encourages us to consider the perspectives of employees when 
thinking about risk management and risk communication strategies across the sector 
and is a prelude to further analysis of a considerable quantity of qualitative data 
collected in the course of the study. 
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The final paper of the day is presented by Captain Mohamed Ghanem. Captain 
Ghanem begins with a description of accident causation models which have made an 
impact upon organisational practices and accident investigation in several high risk 
sectors (for example nuclear and rail). He then describes how following a process of 
content analysis of existing Marine Accident Investigation Reports it is possible to 
identify an absence of any strong influence from such models (generally speaking) in 
the conduct and reporting of accident investigations. Implicit within the paper is the 
understanding that if such accident models are not followed in analysing accidents, 
then it is possible that the fundamental causal factors underlying accidents may be 
overlooked and accidents of the same type and with the same underlying causes may 
be repeated time and again.   
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Introduction to Day Two 
 
Helen Sampson  
 
 
In the course of the first session of the SIRC 2009 symposium, the findings from 
several well-established research projects were presented and discussed. By contrast 
the papers presented for the second session derive from the early stages of several 
studies and to some degree can be understood as indicative of future work within the 
Centre.  
 
In the first paper of the morning Professor David Walters discusses the extent to 
which health and safety can be managed across supply chains. The paper derives, in 
large part, from a broad literature review undertaken in relation to land-based supply 
chains. The main findings and implications of this review are sketched out before 
being considered in relation to the maritime context. This work builds not only upon 
the extensive work of Professor Walters in relation to health and safety management 
but also upon previous work conducted at the Centre on behalf of EMSA which 
illustrated, amongst other things, the unseen ‘costs’ of the outsourcing of labour in 
relation to standards of education and training. This, as well as preliminary work 
relating to some of the health and safety implications of chartering relationships will 
be combined in an attempt to seek future funding to conduct detailed empirical work 
relating to the management of health and safety across supply chains in the maritime 
sector. 
 
The second paper of the session relates to an exciting new project which will be 
undertaken in connection with the Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Research Unit  
(LRETRU), but which also forms the basis for the PhD of one of the Centre’s long-
standing Research Associates – Mr Neil Ellis. The study, which is in its early stages, 
will consider the relationship between the built environment and the health and well-
being of seafarers. In doing so, it will consider the physical and social impact of 
vessel design and will point to some ways in which relatively minor, but nevertheless, 
beneficial changes might be effected without great cost to ship operators. The paper is 
indicative of work and ideas to come rather than definitive in its objectives. It 
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provides us with some food for thought in relation to the internal design of ships and 
reminds us of the importance of the environment in which we live and work and how 
the quality of the built environment may impact upon well-being.  
 
The final paper of the day is presented by Dr Lijun Tang (formerly a SIRC-Nippon 
Foundation Fellow) who has recently joined the team of the LRETRU in order to 
further the planned programme of work for the Unit. The first study with which Dr 
Tang has been engaged relates to the introduction of new technology aboard vessels 
and the exploration of the provision of associated training. Phase one of this research 
has already been completed. It entailed focussing upon the introduction of AIS and 
considering the extent to which seafarers appeared to be competent with regard to its 
use and management. This was assessed following periods of data collection at the 
Dover Coastguard which focussed upon AIS transmission errors and VHS 
communications. Phase Two of the study combines the use of qualitative interviews 
and a large scale questionnaire in an attempt to understand more about the experiences 
of seafarers in relation to training centred upon new technologies and new pieces of 
on board equipment. Dr Tang reports upon the findings of an initial literature review 
considering the effectiveness, and usefulness, of training for ICT in shore-based 
sectors, and additionally highlights the findings of a small number of interviews with 
seafarers and maritime lecturers which facilitated the development of a better 
understanding of the issues of relevance, and underpinned the design of a 
questionnaire which will be distributed to seafarers internationally in the coming 
months.  
 
Feedback on the content of the papers presented herewith is welcome and should be 
addressed in the first instance to the author/s of the paper/s concerned. 
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Patterns in injury reporting 
 
 
Neil Ellis, Michael Bloor & Helen Sampson 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
This paper considers injury data obtained from 16 anonymised maritime 
administrations. Evidence is examined of reporting biases which militate against the 
aggregation of different administrations’ datasets. Some important dimensions of 
reporting bias are analysed. Taking two different large maritime administrations, 
evidence is presented indicating that injuries are systematically under-reported in 
general cargo ships, compared to other types of trades, and that injuries are 
systematically under-reported by some crew nationalities within a given maritime 
administration. The paper concludes that there is a clear need to invest in studies of 
the social processes of shipboard injury reporting, if we are to be able to interpret 
seafarer injury statistics.  
 
Keywords: injury rates; reporting bias; injury reporting; secondary analysis 
 
 
 
The occupation of seafaring is characterised by comparatively high rates of work-
related deaths and injuries. In the last two decades a small number of studies have 
demonstrated that seafaring, alongside commercial fishing, is an occupation with one 
of the highest identified rates of mortality in OECD countries such as Denmark and 
the UK (Roberts and Williams 2007, Hansen 1996). However, robust data on seafarer 
fatalities and most notably work-related injuries has been scarce in relation to the 
global fleet and the international workforce.  
 
The reasons for such scarcity become rapidly apparent when setting out to undertake 
research on seafarer deaths and injuries across the global fleet, as we have recently 
attempted in conjunction with a research project on perceptions of risk established as 
part of the programme of work undertaken at the Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust 
Research Unit. Here we have been beset with problems of accessing data from 
Maritime Administrations (where some are reluctant to make such information public 
or may not collect/collate it at all) and in working with such data as have been kindly 
made available. The methods we have utilised in collecting data for this study have 
been previously outlined (Ellis 2007) however it is worth briefly rehearsing some of 
2 
the major difficulties associated with the analysis of seafarer injury and fatality data 
before briefly outlining the methods we have used in collecting the data underpinning 
this paper and discussing how that data which is available is best interpreted and  
understood. 
 
 
Deficiencies in available data 
 
In order to produce occupational rates of injury or fatality it is necessary to have 
access to relatively reliable information on both the numbers of reported injuries and 
fatalities at sea by flag (for example), and within a given time period. This is termed 
numerator data. However, it is also necessary to know the numbers of seafarers 
employed on ships carrying the specific flag concerned in the same time period. These 
are termed denominator data. The presence of both types of data allows for a rate to 
be calculated which can then be utilised in making comparisons between, or within, 
industries – for different vessel types for example, or for different flags. The problems 
in collecting such data in the shipping industry are both that there are considerable 
reporting biases apparent in the available numerator data (numbers of casualties), and 
that there is an absence of reliable denominator data - so that often the numbers of 
seafarers employed is not known and an estimate is established in its stead. This 
allows for the presentation of, at best, a patchy and somewhat unreliable picture of 
seafarer casualty rates.  
 
 
Method 
 
Fatality and injury numerator data were collected as part of a larger study which 
collected accident and incident data from maritime administrations (Ellis 2007). Such 
administrations are legally required to record all accidents and major incidents that 
occur to their flagged vessels, and thus were seen as a comparatively robust source of 
casualty data. The largest 30 administrations, as defined by gross tonnage, were sent 
questionnaires which asked about the type of casualty data kept, the nature of these 
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(i.e. casualty reports, statistics, tabulated), as well as whether the administrations 
would be willing to provide these data for academic research.  These 30 
administrations represented 87.5% of the world fleet’s overall gross tonnage (Lloyd’s 
Register Fairplay 2005). Of these,16 provided casualty data. In order to compare the 
data provided by the administrations the datasets were recoded to allow representation 
in a standardised format. This recoding related to incident types, rank of seafarers, and 
vessel types. Fishing and navy vessels were excluded from the datasets. Although data 
were provided for a large range of years, a common dataset was only available for a 
shorter range of 2000 to 2005. As a condition of their provision the source of data was 
anonymised, and is referred to by an alphabetical identifier. 
 
For the present analysis, the 16 maritime administrations were re-contacted and asked 
to provide denominator data on their seafarer populations.  Of the 16, seven provided 
this information. Information about the number of ships in the world fleet was 
obtained from annually published World Fleet Statistics (e.g. Lloyd’s Register 
Fairplay 2005). 
 
 
The interpretation of available injury data 
 
When the data sent by the sixteen maritime administrations were considered in detail 
it was found that only seven provided data which could be used with regard to the 
reporting of seafarer injuries. Of these, four provided sufficient detail to allow us to 
categorise the information on injuries into different types corresponding with 
commonly utilised groupings, i.e. break, fracture, dislocation; bruising; burns; 
crush/trap injuries; cuts/piercings; electric shocks; strains, sprains, twists; loss of 
consciousness; other. The distribution of the reported injuries is illustrated in Table 
One which also includes the data available on numbers of fatalities for the 
administrations concerned in the same time frame. 
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Table 1: Injuries and Fatalities Compared Across Four Flags 2000-05 
 
 Flag A Flag B  Flag C Flag D 
Break, Fracture, Dislocation 26 
(9.0%) 
49 
(36.6%) 
9 
(4.9%) 
439 
(25.2%) 
Bruising 3 
(1.0%) 
14 
(10.4%) 
 272 
(15.6%) 
Burn 15 
(5.2%) 
6 
(4.5%) 
6 
(3.3%) 
68 
(3.9%) 
Crush or Trap Injury 12 
(4.1%) 
12 
(9.0%) 
 116 
(6.6%) 
Cut or piercing injury 22 
(7.6%) 
27 
(20.1%) 
1 
(0.5%) 
279 
(16.0%) 
Electric Shock  1 
(0.7%) 
 8 
(0.5%) 
Strain, sprain or twist 6 
(2.1%) 
15 
(11.2%) 
 456 
(26.1%) 
Unconscious 1 
(0.3%) 
5 
(3.7%) 
 37 
(2.1%) 
Other 5 
(1.7%) 
3 
(2.2%) 
  
Fatalities 200 
(69.0%) 
2 
(1.5%) 
167 
(91.3%) 
70 
(4.0%) 
 
 
The major conclusion which can be drawn from these data is that there is considerable 
variation in the practice of recording/reporting injuries across maritime 
administrations. The ratio of injuries to fatalities might be expected to vary across 
administrations for any given year, however, it could reasonably be anticipated that 
injuries would outweigh fatalities where injuries are being reported in any kind of 
systematic fashion. However, these data indicate that for two, of the four, 
administrations (A and C) numbers of reported fatalities are far higher than numbers 
of reported injuries with fatalities constituting 91% of all reports in administration C, 
and 69% of the total reports in administration A. This clearly indicates significant 
under-reporting of injuries in these administrations which may only record injuries 
associated with major incidents (where fatalities have occurred alongside non-fatal 
injuries for example), or may only record those injuries deemed to be most serious. 
Such variations in recording/reporting practices make it impossible to aggregate data 
across administrations, as like cannot be compared with like, and the data are clearly 
unreliable.  However, data produced by individual maritime administrations may be 
analysed to consider, for example, variations in patterns over time, variations in 
reporting by rank and variations in reporting by nationality.  
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When we considered trends in data over time across individual maritime 
administrations we were able to identify a tendency for injuries and fatalities to 
reduce over the period. In one Administration – E – these trends for injuries and 
fatalities were found to be statistically significant (see Table Two).   
    
Table 2: Seven-year Trend Data in Injuries and Fatalities in Flag-State E  
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Seafarer Population 23,470 23,225 22,282 21,836 21,683 22.343 22,995 
Injuries 912 
(3.9%) 
778 
(3.3%) 
881 
(3.6%) 
774 
(3.5%) 
635 
(2.9%) 
444 
(2.0%) 
422 
(1.8%) 
Fatalities 22 
(0.1%) 
17 
(0.1%) 
13 
(0.1%) 
11 
(0.1%) 
28 
(0.1%) 
9 
(0.0%) 
5 
(0.0%) 
 
In another administration (D) where we only have denominator data (that is, numbers 
of seafarers data) for those seafarers based in the home state, home-state officers were 
found to have significantly lower injury rates over the six-year period 2000-05 than 
home-state ratings (see Table Three). 
  
Table 3: Six-Year Trend Data in Injuries by Rank 2000-05 in Flag-State D 
(Home State Seafarers Only) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total officers & cadets  14,080 13,900 14,070 14,580 14,670 14,950 
Total ratings 10,800 6,680 9,510 10,490 10,270 9,320 
Officer Injuries 1 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.0%) 
2 
(0.0%) 
8 
(0.1%) 
Ratings Injuries 10 
(0.1%) 
3 
(0.0%) 
10 
(0.1%) 
18 
(0.2%) 
32 
(0.3%) 
22 
(0.2%) 
Total Injuries 11 
(0.0%) 
3 
(0.0%) 
11 
(0.0%) 
19 
(0.1%) 
34 
(0.1%) 
30 
(0.1%) 
 
  
In relation to variations in injury rates according to nationality a debate between 
academics interested in such patterns has been on-going for some time and concerns 
the identification of apparently different rates of injuries across different national 
groups. These may be interpreted as ‘real differences’ in which case they are 
generally considered to indicate differences in risk taking behaviours (see for example 
Hansen 2008) or they may be considered to be manifestations of different reporting 
practices which might relate to considerations such as employment status (i.e. 
temporary as opposed to permanent contracts) and fear of job loss.  
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To shed further light on this issue we have examined the reported injuries for one 
maritime administration (E) over a seven-year period. In doing this we have 
considered reports of ‘slips, trips and falls’ against reports of all other injury types on 
the assumption that slips, trips and falls represent the least incapacitating category of 
injuries and are thus most subject to variations in self- reporting, i.e. these are the 
kinds of minor injuries most likely to go un-reported by seafarers. We have also 
compared two single nationality groups (home state and Filipino seafarers grouped 
separately) with all other nationals grouped together. Despite the fact that this analysis 
considers data where we know that we have a great deal of missing information we 
nevertheless feel that there is evidence that there are nationality-based variations in 
injury reporting: as a proportion of the total numbers of injuries they report, Filipinos 
and other nationalities both report significantly fewer slips, trips and falls than 
seafarers from the home (flag) state (see Table Four). 
 
Table 4: 2000-06 Injury Rates by Reported Cause in Flag-State E, comparing 
Home-State-Nationals, Other Nationals and Filipinos 
 
 Home-
State 
Other 
Nationals 
Filipinos Filipinos and other 
nationals combined 
Slips, trips or falls 
on same level 
538 
(30.8%) 
73 
(19.5%) 
138 
(26.0%) 
211 
(23.3%) 
All other injuries 1206 
(69.2%) 
302 
(80.5%) 
392 
(74.0%) 
694 
(76.7%) 
 
 
Such data do not necessarily invalidate the arguments mentioned earlier of Hansen 
and others that there may be cultural differences in risk behaviour between different 
national groups, but they do indicate that there are also systematic differences 
between national groups in their propensity to self- report injuries, particularly where 
these are less severe. 
 
Such reporting biases were also manifestly present when we considered variations in 
injury patterns by ship type. Here, as with the maritime administrations, we see that 
whilst some ship types have predictable ratios of injuries to fatalities for others, the 
ratios are highly disproportionate and indicative of high levels of under-reporting in 
relation to injuries (see Table Five).  We have compared general cargo, passenger/ro 
ro, tankers/OBOs and all other ship types (grouped) to facilitate analysis and it can be 
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seen that reports of injuries from general cargo ships disproportionately appear to 
represent fatalities (16%) and involve only a very small quantity (6.6%) of reports of 
minor injuries (represented by the separate consideration of strains, sprains, and 
twists). In contrast, the proportion of fatalities reported in relation to passenger/ro ro 
vessels is very low (0.79%) whilst of all reported injuries aboard these vessels very 
minor injuries (strains, sprains and twists) make up a considerable proportion of the 
total (30.1%) which is more in line with reasonable expectation. This indicates that 
aboard general cargo vessels there is a tendency to report only serious injuries and 
fatalities whilst this tendency is less pronounced for other vessel types (particularly 
passenger/ro ro vessels).  
 
 
Table 5: Injury Rate by Reported Cause in Flag-State D, compared by ship-type  
 
 Fatalities Strains, Sprains, 
or Twists 
All other 
non-fatal 
injuries 
Total 
General Cargo 17 
(16%) 
7 
(6.6%) 
82 
(77.3%) 
106 
(100%) 
Tanker (incl OBO) 4 
(3.5%) 
15 
(13.2%) 
94 
(83.1%) 
113 
(100%) 
Passenger & Ro-Ro* 8 
(0.79%) 
307 
(30.1%) 
702 
(69%) 
1017 
(100%) 
All other ship types 41 
(5.9%) 
127 
(18.4%) 
522 
(75.6%) 
690 
(100%) 
*NB data do not include information on passenger injuries. Passengers are not included in the dataset.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In understanding patterns of injuries amongst seafarers it is essential to recognise that 
any injury data collated by maritime administrations are subject to potentially 
significant reporting biases given the fact that seafarers (either those injured or their 
seniors) are able to decide whether or not to report injuries to maritime 
administrations and may choose not to do so. Reasons for failure to report might 
include: a fear of repatriation by the ir company; a fear of not being re-hired by their 
company; a fear of being ‘blamed’ for causing their own injury – of getting ‘into 
trouble’ and so forth.  
8 
This account has demonstrated that whilst there may be very real differences in 
patterns of seafarer injuries which could possibly relate to different trades, jobs, risk 
practices, and so forth, the currently available data cannot robustly support such 
interpretations given that reporting biases are as demonstrably high as we have shown 
them to be.  
 
The social processes of shipboard injury reporting and the individual requirements 
and practices of maritime administrations are inevitably complex and quite unstudied, 
but there is a need to invest in such studies if we are to be able to better interpret 
seafarer injury statistics in the future.   
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Making Sense of Differences in Perceptions of Risk 
 
 
Nick Bailey 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Within high risk industries such as the rail and nuclear sectors, it has been found that 
different work groups within an organisation may perceive risk differently. This has 
implications for the effective management of occupational health and safety and the 
development of an organisational safety culture.  This paper reports on a study 
examining such differences within the maritime industry and is based on five in-depth 
case studies, which were undertaken following the administration of a questionnaire1.  
Specifically the paper points to a number of factors that appear to contribute to how 
those in the maritime industry perceive work-based risk. 
 
Keywords  
Risk perception, Work-groups, OHS management, Maritime 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Through the processes of upbringing and schooling individuals are socialised into a 
given culture(s) and recognised ways of seeing the world which shape how they 
behave and act in different situations (Goslin, 1969; Schaffer, 1996). Likewise when 
individuals enter the world of work, they undergo a process of secondary socialisation 
as they are assimilated into both organisational and professional cultures (Brim and 
Wheeler, 1965; Carter, 1995; Coffey, 1996). In highly striated organisations with 
differentiated work-groups there may be different professional or work based cultures 
operating within the overall dominant organisational culture.  That is, within 
organisations different work-groups while being socialised into the dominant 
organisational culture may still identify with particular work-based ways of seeing 
and doing. This tendency is strongly associated with occupations where professional 
learning is largely based on practice and time spent doing the job, i.e. as a form of 
apprenticeship. Newcomers to such work groups learn and gain proficiency by 
understudying experts or master practitioners. In such a context learning involves 
 
1 The findings from the questionnaire were reported at the SIRC 2007 Symposium. 
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discovering how to become like the expert, how to be a practitioner and so invo lves 
learning the wider social values, beliefs and ways of acting (Wenger, 1998).   
 
Seafaring practice has developed over many years and is reproduced time and again 
on ships as one-generation passes on their experience to another. Although the system 
of training, especially for officers, incorporates a significant amount of college-based 
learning, nonetheless a fundamental part of the training and education of officers, and 
other workers, is based on experience in the job, with workers learning from their 
superiors and colleagues. It is through extended periods of ship-based practice, time 
spent doing the job in the company of other more experienced workers, that 
individuals are trained and acquire relevant skills. The importance of ‘time served’ is 
that workers not only learn how to “do” navigation, engineering or catering, but they 
become  navigators, engineers and caterers. Thus as they become fully fledged 
members of a particular community of practice, they are likely to develop distinct 
work-based ways of understanding, seeing and doing. Indeed, in a number of high risk 
industries with organisations that are clearly striated with different and distinct work 
groups, such as the rail and nuclear industry, it has been found that different groups of 
workers developed their own unique concerns, objectives and behaviours (Harvey et 
al., 2002; Clarke, 1999). 
 
With the introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the 
emphasis within the industry has moved from that of safety underpinned by 
professionalism and expertise to one inscribed within formal managerial systems and 
procedures. The emphasis is now on Managers to actively manage safety, in large 
part, through the creation of a common managerially led shipboard safety culture.  As 
such a failure to appreciate differences in perception and understanding between 
‘work-groups’ within an organisation can undermine the effective management of 
health and safety. Safety procedures or new initiatives, for example, may be 
misconstrued or ignored by groups of workers if they are not introduced in ways that 
chime with their understanding of situations. Indeed such interventions may be 
received with hostility and so serve to undermine the existing safety culture (Clarke, 
1999; Harvey, et al. 2000).  As Nordenstam and Di Mento (1990) have stated, safety 
initiatives and risk communication may fail due to a number of problems including: 
“source problem (who says it), message problem (what is said), channel problems 
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(how it is said)” (cited Gowda, 2003: 330). There has, however, been little research in 
this area within the maritime industry, and yet the structural arrangements that 
characterise it seem especially pertinent, as ships operate remotely from direct 
management oversight and the structural arrangements onboard naturally align 
seafarers according to a number of different work-based affiliations based on, for 
example, department and rank. 
 
In 2005, the Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Research Unit (LRETRU), within the 
Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) at Cardiff University conducted a 
large scale questionnaire survey of managers and shipboard workers in the maritime 
sector in order to ascertain whether different work groups perceived work-based risk 
differently.  The survey produced 2372 completed responses from individuals from 50 
countries. This represented a response rate of approximately 36%. The key findings of 
the survey identified that there were indeed statistically significant differences 
between the ways in which different groups saw risk, principally along the 
dimensions of rank, work department, and nationality. To a lesser extent differences 
were also found according to age and experience (Bailey et al., 2006 and 2007). 
 
As part of the study, the questionnaire survey was further supplemented by five in-
depth case studies. This involved interviews with managers and shipboard workers in 
five companies, both in the company offices and aboard ship. Formal interviews were 
further complemented by observation and analysis of company documents. In total 
some 125 interviews were undertaken and time was spent aboard nine ships ranging 
from a couple of days to a month in duration. The aim of this part of the study was to 
gather data to further elucidate the findings of the questionnaire survey. Based on 
provisional analysis of the case study data, this paper will point to a number of 
features that appear to contribute to how those in the maritime industry perceive 
work-based risk.  
 
Findings 
 
Training, Experience and Situated Knowledge 
 
As would be expected training represents one of the key factors in shaping 
perceptions of risk. During the interviews we conducted with seafarers they 
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repeatedly referred to their training and experience of doing the job. Reference was 
made to a number of forms of training including: STCW training, familiarisation or 
induction training, specific Health & Safety courses relating to particular activities - 
such as welding or the use of grinding wheels, and practice-based training 
understudying colleagues.  As one Chief Engineer commented, it is through hands on 
experience, time served, that individuals develop an appreciation for risk, and he 
lamented the fact that sea-time has been reduced as a requirement for obtaining 
STCW certificates. 
[W]e’re going away from training people with practical hands on experience 
to deal with things, and then cos that would then go back to the risk 
assessment, you’d learn by being on the job, you learn by working with 
people, the risks and everything… you’re taught safe practices.  (A, CE1) 
 
Likewise an AB stated that he first learnt of shipboard hazards while undertaking his 
initial training. 
From school of course.  First from school then training centre.  Then you need 
to apply on the ship when you arrive. (A, AB2-1) 
 
In addition to general pre-sea and STCW training, as one manager pointed out, 
individuals also learnt of risks from undertaking specialised training such as fire 
fighting and welding courses. 
 
There’s targeted health and safety training such as you know welding courses, 
grinding wheels, that sort of thing, but not so much here as a general health 
and safety course… (C, Manager2) 
 
From analysis of the transcripts it was also evident that individuals make reference to 
their technical knowledge acquired during the course of their training and time doing 
the job. The knowledge, thus gained, informs what they see as hazards and how they 
assess risks in the context of their work. For instance, the following comment by a 
Chief Engineer makes reference to the perceived risks of fire due to a possible rupture 
of a high pressure fuel pipe and lack of sheathing. In explaining why he sees this as a 
risk, he draws on his technical knowledge of trends in the industry and applies it to 
the specific situation onboard. 
In terms of the main hazard to the ship itself? 
I would say high pressured fuel at high temperature 
 
That’s leading to potential fire? 
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Yes, I mean the main engine, the lower pressure fuel rails are at 10 bar 
pressure, both with the main engine and with the generators, and if you have a 
failure on one of those then… There’s been big moves over the years to 
double sheath pipes, for a long time, pipes are now becoming more and more 
frequently sheathed … (A, CE2) 
 
In the same way this captain draws on his general technical understanding of tank 
cleaning operations and applies it to the conditions onboard his ship. 
Just in general what do you think is most the dangerous hazard, or the 
greatest hazard on these types of ships? 
I think it’s probably the tank cleaning operations, yeah the tank cleaning 
operations, because we do tank cleaning operations in a non-controlled 
atmosphere, we don’t have inert gas on these ships, so you have to be very, 
very, careful when you do tank cleaning operations… (E, Cpt1) 
 
Reference to training and experience of doing the job appeared repeatedly in 
individuals’ accounts of how they “knew” about the risks they faced.  
 
Awareness of Incidents 
Risk communication is recognised within the academic literature as an important 
factor in raising risk awareness and modifying the ways in which groups perceive risk 
(Fischhoff, 1995; Gowda, 2003). Governments in particular utilise this strategy with 
the presentation of risk information through advertising campaigns in the various 
media of television, radio and print. The aim is to modify behaviour by making 
individuals more aware of the risks they face, as for example with the current 
campaign highlighting the risks of using mobile telephones while driving. In the same 
way organisations like the UK Maritime Accident Investigation Bureau (MAIB) 
publish reports that describe maritime incidents in order to raise awareness of how 
things may go wrong and to highlight potential lessons that can be learned to avoid 
such events. In a similar manner, many companies collate their information relating to 
numbers and types of incidents as part of their procedures for safety management.  
 
From the findings it was apparent that awareness of actual incidents was a key factor 
in informing risk perceptions. The way in which individuals gained such information 
varied from formal statistical data and written accounts of incidents, to stories heard 
and personal experience. Interestingly different sources of information appeared to 
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have differing degrees of meaning for workers occupying different positions in the 
occupational hierarchy.   
 
The companies in this study all collected accident data, and clearly for those in 
management charged with managing OHS, this information was a central factor 
informing their perceptions of risk.  As one manager commented, he had access to a 
wide range of detailed information about safety within the fleet, and as such believed 
that he had a well informed overview. 
Yes we have review meetings, in fact what we’ve just instigated recently is a 
formal review meeting once a month now before the monthly management 
meeting to review all the safety related issues such as the near miss hazard 
alerts, non-conformances, safety management meeting issues …I’m intimately 
linked with what’s happening on the ships so I understand all the issues, and I 
think it’s the closeness to the ships, the regular meetings, the regular flow of 
information, I see the defect reports, I see the condition reports, I see accident 
statistics, near miss hazard alerts, all the masters’ reports, so there’s a broad 
flow of information across my desk which keeps me in contact with what’s 
going on. (C, Manager2) 
 
With access to fleet wide data managers claimed to have a good sense of the 
operational risks associated with their vessels, at least in terms of the types and 
frequency of incidents that occur. 
 
While individuals at other ranks within the participating companies generally had 
access to a version of this information, either in statistical form or as accounts of 
accidents often attached to advisory circulars, they appeared to draw on such 
information to a far lesser degree when accounting for their understandings of 
shipboard risk. Such information was typically circulated through the safety 
committee meeting and made available in mess rooms or pinned to the safety officer’s 
notice board, as this captain stated: 
Well that’s their main thing, they have this quarterly review which lists all the 
accidents, lists their advisement, what they see … we have the safety meetings 
and it goes through that, feedback to the ship through the safety committee. 
(A, Cpt1) 
 
In general senior officers were the most likely to refer to these formal accounts of 
incidents and several commented that they were aware of incidents within the wider 
fleet from attending office-based seminars or talking to senior officers aboard other 
ships. As one Captain commented the office-based seminars drew his attention to 
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incidents on other ships that caused him to re-examine potential hazards aboard his 
own vessel. 
Oh yeah, and it’s not just that, you can meet people as well and exchange 
ideas…you hear pretty much what’s going-on on every vessel because you 
know people talk, it’s the grapevine, so in a way that’s instructive because it 
makes you think, when something happens on another vessel, an unfortunate 
event, then you tend to go and check, make sure it won’t happen on your 
vessel. (E, Cpt1).  
 
 
As well as company reports, individuals made reference to incidents that they had 
learned of from more general publications such as newspaper accounts and MAIB 
reports. For instance, a senior captain expressed his concern about the risk of fire. In 
explaining his concern, he referred to two other ships that had experienced serious 
fires and the problems they had in dealing with them. From knowledge of these cases, 
he was able to extrapolate from their experience and relate it to the particular 
conditions aboard his current vessel. 
But another big hazard would be if you had a dangerous cargo fire, you know, 
there was [company name], had one, heard alongside they towed the ship out 
to anchor, took about 5 days to put the fire out and 300 containers damaged, it 
was just a hazardous box caught fire in the middle of the stack, you haven’t 
got the manpower to … Something like a million tonnes of water were poured 
on that to put the fire out, well there’s no way we can put ... something like 
that, I think fire at sea is everybody’s biggest fear, ship’s don’t sink, the ship is 
the biggest lifeboat, ships don’t normally sink. (A, Cpt1) 
 
In a similar manner when asked to identify the main shipboard hazards, a number of 
senior officers (typically those that also served as shipboard safety officers) made 
reference to their knowledge of the more common types of injury that actually 
occurred aboard their vessels and their causes. As this Chief Officer pointed out: 
On these particular types of ships, where would you see the main hazards 
being, what would be the main concerns? 
I guess slips and trips are the common injuries, the engine room is usually a 
good source of injuries. (A1, CO)  
 
As the shipboard safety officers, these individuals were responsible for investigating 
any incidents and for maintaining incident records, and so they tended to be aware of 
the frequency and consequences of such events. Given this aspect of their job, such 
information thus appeared to have meaning for them.  
 
16 
By comparison the larger portion of the shipboard crew seldom referred to these 
formal accounts of incidents as informing their perceptions. Indeed some individuals 
denied knowledge of them, even when a copy had been observed by the researcher to 
be pinned to the nearby safety notice-board. Thus while formal accounts of incidents 
and statistics had significant meaning for managers and to varying degrees senior 
officers in terms of their understanding of risk, for many workers they had little 
meaning in terms of informing their risk understandings. 
 
Of crew members who acknowledged having read incident reports, a number 
commented that in general they had little impact in terms of raising risk awareness. 
The reasons given were that the reports constituted just another set of documents that 
had to be read amongst all the other paperwork onboard, and secondly that one can 
become de-sensitised to such information, as the following comment makes clear. 
 [W]hen I was with [name of previous company] you know every ship, the 
number of near misses reported, you were quoted to achieve near misses and 
blah, blah, blah and all the rest of it and statistics, pie charts and God knows 
what else arrived in the sort of, you eventually end up desensitising to you 
know a big raft of things and do I really have to look through all of this like 
you know. (E, CO1) 
 
Other safety related information to be found onboard that was referred to included 
safety posters. In one company, in particular, these were mentioned by a number of 
individuals. At least one seafarer reported that he had been influenced by a safety 
poster. 
Do you ever read any books or anything on the ship that tells you about jobs 
and things you should do? 
Yes here in the bridge, and we have one poster that show you how to lift 
buckets, you do like this… (A, AB2-1) 
 
The issue of becoming de-sensitised to risk information, however, was also cited in 
relation to safety posters, with crew members claiming that they simply became blind 
to them. 
 
A further factor that emerged in relation to such formally presented information, in 
terms of how they were seen and the impact they had on risk perception, was that of 
relevance.  When asked whether such information contributed to their understanding 
of risk, many seafarers commented that the information provided was not relevant to 
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their particular ship or situation. Specifically, it was often claimed that the advice 
presented failed to take account of the practicalities of the actual situation onboard, as 
the following comment from a second engineer illustrates.  
I saw some signs, I think for manual handling and lifting. 
Yes we have got information on manual handling, and tells you to use all these 
bits and pieces but you haven’t got these bits and pieces.  But you can’t use 
them on the ship anyway because everything’s in the way, you know you can’t 
use a sack trolley or anything else because it wouldn’t fit through half the 
spaces you want to take things.  Cranes obviously don’t reach everywhere on 
the ship.  There’s a lot, you do, do a lot of manual handling. (C, 2E1) 
 
In a similar manner, Company risk assessments and formal procedures are a central 
feature of Safety Management Systems and as such might have been expected to play 
a role in raising awareness and in shaping how individuals perceived work related 
risk. From the interviews and observation it was found that while some crew members 
made explicit reference to the formal system of procedures and risk assessment when 
accounting for their understanding of shipboard hazards, in general, although 
shipboard personnel tended to act in accordance with the procedures and requirements 
outlined in these formal documents, they seldom made explicit reference to them in 
their accounts of work-place risk. 
 
 
Sharing Information between Peers 
 
As well as learning through formal training and from company communications, 
individuals also learned from interactions with colleagues. Such interactions generally 
took the form of work instructions, toolbox talks or, more commonly, informal 
discussion. Reference was made to all three forms of learning by interviewees. For 
example, one AB described learning from his senior colleagues, in this case a bosun 
who pointed out the dangers during mooring operations. 
So how do you know that’s what you have to do? 
I know that you know, before you do that you have to be careful and put your 
safety first, always safety first. 
So who told you that, how do you know about it? 
I learnt at the mooring station, the first time you know, my own bosun, I was 
very young, safety person (A, AB1-1) 
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Other ratings commented that the risks, associated with a job, were pointed out 
routinely when they received their work instructions. But equally, as this AB stated, 
such exchanges could go both ways, dependent upon an individual’s experience. 
Yes my experience, his (the Bosun) experience and my experience, so that I 
learn from him, he learn from me. (A, AB2-1) 
 
From both the interviews and onboard observa tion it was noted that break times 
(smokos) were often utilised as an opportunity to discuss work in general and 
particularly forthcoming tasks and possible risks involved. More generally, these 
informal occasions provided the opportunity to share stories, remembered or heard, 
and thereby to forge a common work-based understanding of risks faced.  
 
The Role of Personal Experience 
By comparison with formal informational systems, ‘experience’ appeared to play a 
central role in the development of workers’ understandings of risk. Reference to 
personal experience, in terms of having learnt the risks from doing the job, from 
experience of different companies and ships, and from experience of actual incidents 
or the lack of them, all occurred regularly in the accounts of shipboard workers when 
explaining how they knew about work-based risk. Experience of doing a job was a 
theme returned to time and again, as this comment from a Third Engineer illustrates: 
[It] depends on who’s doing the job, some people may risk something quite 
high, some others might think it’s medium, depends where your safety lies 
really…it changes with experience, maybe a younger person might think oh 
that’s not really dangerous, somebody who’s more experienced who’s 
obviously done the job, depends if you’ve done the job before, that’s a lot to 
do with it… (C, 3E1) 
 
Thus when explicitly asked whether formal risk assessments and company procedures 
contributed to understandings of risk, it was commonly suggested that practical 
learning was more cent ral to understandings of risk than engagement with the formal 
safety management systems. The following quote illustrates this point clearly:  
[I]t’s probably not the right thing to say, I know they are good but I think 
when you’ve been doing the job a dozen times, or twenty or thirty times, 
you’re not going to suddenly look at a risk assessment, you know, perhaps 
where I go wrong, I can’t, you know it’s something you do everyday, it’s like 
getting in your car, you’re not going to sort of read a risk assessment before 
you get in your car are you, you know some of them jobs you are literally 
doing every day, you’re not going to start reading a risk assessment after doing 
it for 5 years or something. 
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So do you go back yourself and look at them at all? 
 
No... they’re perhaps useful to somebody, a cadet or somebody, somebody 
new perhaps to the company, but I mean an experienced engineer, a load of 
that’s all in built you know, you’re checking this and doing that and checking 
it out before you start, and if you don’t do that you shouldn’t really be here 
anyway you know.  A lot if it’s you know, if you’ve been at sea a while and 
you’ve got all that experience, a lot if is you should know it, and a lot of them 
wouldn’t want to read a risk assessment anyway.  (C, CE1) 
 
 
As well as experience of doing the job, a number of individuals related their 
perceptions of work-based risk to their experience of other ships. In some cases the 
differences in perceived levels of safety (including the provision of PPE) led 
individuals, especially ratings, to declare that there were no hazards aboard their 
present vessel. For example, several interviewees commented that, by comparison 
with their former company, the provision of PPE and the implementation of safety 
procedures meant that ‘all was safe ’ as captured by the following remark from an AB.  
[T]his ship is safety, in my opinion yes, I’ve not see any dangers…So you 
were telling me on [Other] ships it’s not like this?...Yes [Other] I have 
experience …is very old ships, we don’t have safety shoes, we have just one 
overall for 10 months you know …a dire condition onboard, one ship we don’t 
have also control and engine room just this ship is very, very old (C, AB1-1) 
 
While some individuals in accounting for the risks they perceived drew comparisons 
between companies or ships, others were influenced by changes within companies 
over time. This was particularly evident where they had witnessed the introduction of 
control measures or more generally a greater emphasis on safety within the 
organisation.  
In terms of risk of injury to yourself when down the engine room or walking 
about the ship, what would you think would be the most likely causes of 
injury? 
Trips and falls I suppose, the rest of it is pretty well sorted out; everything is 
guarded. (C, Eng. Rating1) 
 
What emerged from these comments was a sense that conditions have improved and 
that individuals no longer see risks, believing that they have all been dealt with via the 
introduction of protective measures, i.e. the installation of guarding or the provision 
of PPE. A particular concern here may be that this relative sense that ‘everything is 
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safety’, or hazards are controlled, could lead to an underestimation of, or lack of 
engagement with, work-based hazards. This is an area worthy of further investigation. 
 
Reference to one’s own experience appeared to be an important touch-stone for 
individuals in making sense of the risks they faced. Arguably the factor that had the 
greatest impact on how seafarers perceived risk related to the occurrence of incidents 
that they had personally witnessed or, of which, they had heard first-hand accounts. 
Reference to recent experiences, or lack of them, was commonly given as the basis for 
judgements about hazards faced, as the following two comments from second 
engineers show. 
I think the weather plays a big factor…I mean it’s calm now, but we may have 
to turn sharply that can throw you off balance that sort of thing.  We’ve had 
some rough weather actually this trip before you joined, it was quite nasty… 
(E, 2E1) 
 
I can’t really imagine what the greatest threat would be sort of thing as the 
accidents that sort of cause great injury are so few and far between it is really 
difficult to gauge which one is the sort of worst potential one. (E, 2E2) 
 
Like the above interviewee, for this Chief Officer the lack of a major incident, or at 
least his awareness of such, combined with a sense that control measures were in 
place, informed his perception of the shipboard hazards.  
 What about all that fuel out there is that of a concern to you?  
Well no because I don’t you know, in this day and age the safety procedures in 
place have now more or less tended to circumvent likely explosions. You 
don’t tend to hear of cargo operational explosions very often nowadays. (E, 
CO1) 
 
From the frequency with which officers and ratings in identifying hazards referred to 
personal accounts of incidents or stories heard, such events clearly made a significant 
impression on them in relation to their appreciation of risk. For example, one engine 
room rating described how his perception of the need to wear safety goggles changed 
after he experienced a long term eye infection which was caused by a particle of cargo 
getting in his eye while walking on deck. 
The goggles, at first I was really pissed about, sorry. I was really fed up with 
that, really, really like fed up and was like here we go again, dressed like this 
spaceman … but I had a problem with my eye.  I went to the doctors and …he 
says you have got something in your eye, it is [a small particle of cargo] 
anyway he cleared it up and I thought that, you know, if you had the goggles 
on then it wouldn’t have happened. (C, Eng Rating2) 
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A Bosun also explained why he was concerned about the risk of fire. Despite the fact 
that the crew regula rly conducted drills, his experience of an actual incident led him 
to understand that things could quickly become disorganised and to be concerned 
about the prospect of future fires. 
Well fingers crossed we haven’t encountered any real big emergency in terms 
of fire, a big fire but from what I saw when there was an incident, we were 
going alongside [name of berth] and the bow-thruster blew up, the 
circuitries… the after spring is on the main deck and so I am stood there … the 
off duty AB was at the accommodation door, was that the alarm? What do we 
do? … I think the mate was on the bridge. The second mate went off without a 
radio, I think that perhaps an engineer went as well but the second mate came 
legging it past me about 10 minutes later, shouting fire, fire, fire. … it just 
seemed that nothing that you drill for occurred in that instance. So I dread to 
think. (C, Bosun2) 
 
Tellingly, two ABs (serving aboard the same ship at the time of the interviews) both 
identified different activities when asked what they considered the main risk onboard 
to be. In each case they accounted for their perception with reference to an incident 
that they had previously witnessed aboard other vessels. In the first case the AB 
referred to the dangers of mooring lines parting, and he described an incident that 
happened on one of his former ships. 
[We] were in Brazil, and then the tug, it was a tug, the tug used the ship’s line 
to pushing and pulling the ship, then this OS he arranged the mooring and the 
tug pulled the mooring so the rope slapped the head of the OS, then the OS 
died on the bridge. (A2, AB2) 
 
By comparison the second AB thought that working in enclosed spaces posed the 
greatest risk and he illustrated this with an account of an incident that he had 
witnessed of a fitter falling inside a forepeak space. 
What do you think is the most dangerous job that you do on the ship, which is 
the one which is most likely to hurt you, is it the tug lines or ? 
Well when I experience more dangerous job, I work when we work enclosed 
space…[T]he one fitter … he said just go stand by there, anything we want for 
you just lower it …[but] he wants to help them and he doesn’t know the place, 
he’s not familiar, steep down …he just want to help them, falling down 
because he stepped on the hole …so the man on the top standing by with the 
radio, he called on the bridge and the captain made the alarm then we go for 
rescue, he experienced the actual rescue on the tank … it’s already real (A2, 
AB4) 
 
The ready reference to incidents witnessed, and stories heard, in explaining shipboard 
risk fits with previous research in other sectors which has shown that “people assess 
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the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which 
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 
cited Gowda, 2003: 321). This appears to be an important finding and may help to 
explain why exposure to ‘facts and figures’ may impact so little upon more junior sea-
staff.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A common understanding of safety within an organisation is central to the effective 
management of OHS. However, research shows that different work groups are likely 
to see risk differently. Hence for managers concerned to implement company OHS 
policy, it is necessary to appreciate the various ways in which different work groups 
perceive work-based risk, in order that safety initiatives are implemented in ways that 
are sensitive to such differences.  What the data presented show is that managers and 
seafarers within organisations tended to utilise different resources in making sense of 
the risks faced by workers onboard ship.  
 
The data suggest that, in the participating companies, many managers were able to 
draw in a meaningful way on knowledge of regulatory requirements, statistical 
information and fleet wide incident reports. By contrast, shipboard workers tended to 
refer to a wide and complex range of factors relating to their technical knowledge but 
also, and arguably far more significantly, to their local situated experience of actual 
conditions onboard informed by personal experience and engagement with their co-
workers. That is, the terms of reference for the two groups in general appeared to be 
different. Managers appeared to draw meaning from the formal, the documented, 
whereas what had meaning for shipboard workers was more the personal, the 
experiential – a realm of information not directly available to managers. Recognition 
of these different broad ways of seeing risk is clearly essential for the effective 
management of OHS and the development of appropriate strategies.  To this end, it 
would appear to be prudent for managers to engage in a meaningful way with workers 
to gain an appropriate understanding of differences in the way in which risk is 
perceived. As stated at the outset, these findings are based on an early analysis of the 
LRETRU data and a further in-depth report exploring these issues will be 
forthcoming.  
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Investigating and Reporting Accidents at Sea 
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Abstract 
In order to prevent accidents from repeatedly occurring it is useful to understand and 
locate their causes. Models for analysing and determining the causes of accidents have 
been developed by various scientists since the early twentieth century. The maritime 
industry depends upon Accident Investigation Boards to investigate accidents and 
identify their causes. The public availability of Marine Accident Investigation Reports 
(MAIRs) is seen as an important step towards the improvement of safety in the maritime 
sector. As such, MAIRs are extremely valuable documents. This paper tries to shed some 
light on the relationship between existing accident causation models and the production 
of marine accident investigation reports to consider what, if any, is the relationship 
between them. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is some debate as to whether accidents are decreasing across the board in the 
maritime sector, to what extent, and at what rate. For example, the IMO’s awareness 
bulletin in May 2009, under the heading “Doubts raised on data despite fall in accidents” 
states that:  
“A fall in the number of tanker incidents last year has been 
welcomed but doubts continue to be expressed about the accuracy 
of the statistics. The reported falls follow increases in 2007 of 22% 
and 62% in 2006 according to Intertanko. Similarly, the CDI, which 
represents charterers, recorded a 42% rise in 2007. That sharp 
increase in incidents that include groundings, collisions and engine 
failures prompted the vetting body to step up its inspections." 
LLOYD.S LIST, 22 May 2009, p 8 
 
This paper is not concerned, however, to establish the accuracy of existing accident 
statistics. Rather, it focuses upon the construction of MAIRs and the extent to which they 
appear to be influenced by existing theoretical accident causation models. In doing so, the 
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paper considers the consistencies within,  and/or the differences between, three selected 
investigating boards in investigating and reporting accidents in the maritime industry. 
 
 
Methods 
 
As part of my PhD thesis I have studied the progression and development of accident 
causation theories. These could be said to have started with the Domino theory of W. H. 
Heinrich in 1931 and to have developed all the way through the years to James Reason’s 
1997 ‘Latent Conditions and Active Failures’ model, widely termed the ‘Swiss Cheese 
Model’. Within this study I have considered the analysis of the content of MAIRs in 
relation to Reason’s highly influential Swiss Cheese Model to identify whether or not 
MAIRs are produced with the model in mind. Accordingly, I had to establish a link 
between the classification of ranks onboard, positions in the shipping organisation and 
organisations beyond the shipping organisation concerned, with the levels established 
within Reason’s model. This required a minor adaptation of the ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ 
and the addition of a further level within it as a result of the importance to shipping of 
organisations outside, or beyond shipping companies but, directly associated with 
particular accidents, (port authorities for example). I termed this new level, the ‘Beyond 
Organisational Level’ (BOL) and it was included to allow for the consideration of those 
organisations exterior to the shipping organisation but having an influence on ships and 
their crews, their operation and their organisation. On this basis the analysis of MAIRs 
proceeded by identifying ranks onboard ships, positions within shipping organisations, 
and other related organisations mentioned in the reports and linking them with the 
following levels which are established by Reason and (in relation to the ‘Beyond 
Organisation Level’ ) within my adaptation of Reason’s model: 
- Operational Level (OpL),  
- Supervisory Level (SL),  
- Managerial/ Organisational Level (ML/OL), 
- Beyond Organisational Level (BOL).   
 
In conducting my research, it was most helpful to consider different maritime 
administrations alongside each other. In order to facilitate this comparative analysis I 
thought it was possible and necessary to conduct a content analysis of the reports of 
similar cases (I selected groundings and collisions) produced by three different maritime 
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administrations. In doing so I considered each of the report’s sections separately and I 
then aggregated my results to generate an overall perspective. Therefore, there are content 
analysis results for the reports section by section as well as aggregated results for each 
report and aggregated results for the 10 collision cases and 10 grounding cases for each of 
the three investigating boards.   
 
This method helped to identify any emphasis or apparent omissions in the MAIRs when 
considered in relation to accident causation theory. This paper will highlight Reason’s 
Model and will go on to present the aggregated results for the collision reports 
considered, followed by a description of a single collision case to further clarify the 
findings. 
 
 
The Swiss Cheese Model – Reason 1997 
 
It is interesting to note that whereas investigators, generally speaking, begin with an 
accident and work backwards through a sequence of events to establish an understanding 
of causation, accident causation theorists tend to work in exactly the opposite way. 
Reason explains these differences in approach as follows:  
 
“This model seeks to link the various contributing elements 
into a coherent sequence that runs bottom-up in causation and 
top-down in investigation. The causal story starts with the 
organizational factors: strategic decisions, generic 
organizational processes forecasting, budgeting, allocating 
resources, planning scheduling, communicating, managing, 
auditing, and the like. These processes will be coloured and 
shaped by the corporate culture or the unspoken attitudes and 
unwritten rules concerning the way an organization carries out 
its business. The consequences of these activities are then 
communicated throughout the organization to workplace. 
These include … under-manning, poor supervision, low pay, 
unworkable or ambiguous procedures, poor communication 
and the like.”  (Reason 1997 pp 16) 
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In considering reports on accident investigations therefore, it is worth bearing in mind 
that investigators take their lead from the final unsafe act which caused the accident, and 
attempt to follow the chain of causes backwards. In contrast, the bottom-up approaches  
of accident causation theorists emphasise the radiation of latent conditions within 
organisations and present connected chains of events deemed to produce accidents (see 
Figure 1).  
 
 
Fig 1 - Stages in development and investigation of an organisational accident 
Reason 1997  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Content Analysis Findings (30 collision cases) 
 
Collision cases generally result from errors in navigation and manoeuvring. These errors 
are most usually produced by navigators and those associated with on board navigation 
(as opposed to engineers). As such these ranks are: the master, navigating officers, pilot 
and Able Bodied seamen (the Bridge Team). Possibly, where a collision was a result of 
engine related failure, engineers may be involved. However, after the content analysis for 
the collision cases were conducted, I had to separate the Ranks related to merchant ships 
from those related to non-merchant ships. The total number of Ranks mentioned as 
members of the operational level (as per the Reason model) in all the 30 collision cases 
amounted to 22. Of those 22 Ranks, 15 were related to merchant ships (7 were mentioned 
as cause) and 7 were related to non-merchant ships (4 were mentioned as cause).  
Organisational factors 
Workplace factors 
Unsafe Acts 
Causes 
Investigation 
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The Operational Level 
 
The results of the content analysis which I conducted clearly showed that the total number 
of times a rank classified as ‘operational level’ within the accident causation model was 
mentioned in reports of collisions is very high compared with the number of times the 
same rank is mentioned as causing the accident concerned (Table 1). In other words, 
operational level members of staff are mentioned very many times within a report despite 
the fact that they are stated to be involved in causing an accident much less often. This 
very high number is due to highly detailed and descriptive information within reports 
about what, how and why the accident happened in relation to members of the  operational 
level.    
 
Table 1 – showing 22 different operational ranks associated with 30 collision cases 
Merchant Ship 
Total times Mentioned As Cause Serial Rank 
Inv. 1 Inv. 2  Inv. 3 Inv. 1 Inv. 2  Inv. 3 
1 Master 525 209 569 21 3 22 
2 Chief Officer 386 0 129 17 0 12 
3 Second Officer 218 227 79 16 12 1 
4 Pilot 146 76 58 2 1 0 
5 OOW 141 19 90 11 2 4 
6 Bridge team 10 23 56 0 0 4 
7 AB/Lookout 218 161 34 9 5 0 
8 Third Officer 14 74 12 0 0 0 
9 Cadet 19 0 45 0 0 0 
10 Chief Engineer 18 3 14 0 0 0 
11 Second Engineer 0 0 9 0 0 0 
12 Engineer 13 4 15 0 0 0 
13 Electrician 0 3 0 0 0 0 
14 Crew 175 106 141 0 0 0 
15 Helmsman 0 0 18 0 0 0 
Total 15 Rank 1873 905 1269 76 23 43 
Other than a Merchant ship 
1 Skipper 172 420 275 14 22 32 
2 Deckhands 77 162 103 3 0 4 
3 Tug Master 40 83 16 3 4 1 
4 Coxswain 0 106 0 0 1 0 
5 Yachtsmen 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Pump man 4 0 0 0 0 0 
7 Boatswain 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 7 Ranks 294 771 395 20 27 37 
G. Total 22 Rank 2167 1676 1664 96 50 80 
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The Supervisory level Positions  
 
The supervisory level is very important within an organization. This level has the 
characteristics of supervising the operational level and ensuring decisions made by upper 
levels are passed on to, and fulfilled by, the operational level (linking the upper levels 
with the operational level). The supervisory level in addition, passes over status reports, 
needs and requests made by the operational level to upper levels within organisations. In 
this way the stability of an organisation (including a shipping organisation) is maintained. 
However, the outcome of the content analysis  shows that consideration of this level is 
almost entirely missing within maritime accident investigation reports (see Table 2).  
 
Notwithstanding the absence of specific references to supervisory positions such as 
superintendents within the reports, it was sometimes implicit that there were deficiencies 
in supervision, i.e. at the supervisory level. For example where reports variously stated: 
“Neither bridge was manned as required by company orders” and “the watch keeper was 
distracted from lookout duties … unaware of developing situation … unable to fulfil his 
obligations” and “Operating with just two watch keeping officers, a master and a mate, in 
the coasting and near continental trade, will inevitably lead, on occasions, to the officers 
becoming fatigued. It is necessary to adjust the vessel’s programme to allow the officers 
to gain sufficient rest before putting to sea” and “the AB never undertook bridge watch 
keeping duties. This was in contravention of STCW95”, it would seem that deficiencies in 
supervision on board, or via superintendents are likely to have been associated causes of 
the resulting accidents.   
 
Table 2 - Showing Supervisory Level positions associated with 30 collision cases 
 
 
The Managerial/Organizational level Positions  
 
This level combines two levels as compared with other industries (Managerial level and 
Organizational level). The decis ion to combine these two levels is because Owners (OL) 
Total times Mentioned As Cause Serial Rank 
Inv. 1 Inv. 2  Inv. 3 Inv. 1 Inv. 2  Inv. 3 
1 Superintendent 3 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Not specified 3 1 1 0 0 0 
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can be managers (ML) and can also be the ship’s Master is some cases. In addition, the 
number of Ranks which constitutes these two levels is few (see Table 3).  
 
As I found in relation to the supervisory level it was also the case that some causes 
identified within reports which were not specifically identified by the authors as related to 
management nevertheless appeared to be so. Comments such as: ‘greater consideration 
need be given … particularly in view of the ever increasing number of multinationals’, 
and ‘the employment of a dedicated lookout might well have prevented the collision’ 
suggest that management decisions are more heavily implicated than the specific 
references to management within reports suggest. Clearly the employment of 
multinationals and employment of a dedicated lookout is Managerial/Organisational 
responsibility yet specific reference to management or management decisions in this 
context is obscured.  
 
Table 3 - Managerial/ Organizational positions associated with 30 collision cases 
 
 
The Beyond Organizational Level Organisations  
 
The Beyond Organizational Level constitutes all authorities, organizations, councils, 
manufacturers, etc. with the power to influence and/or amend rules and regulations, and 
with the power to influence the environment within which ships operate (for example by 
providing accurate information e.g. charts, or by undertaking certain activities e.g. 
dredging channels, navigational aids etc). This level was found to be associated with the 
Investico one  
Rank/Mentioned/ Causes 
Investico Two 
Rank/Mentioned/ Causes 
Investico Three 
Rank/ Mentioned/ Causes 
Co. Manager 65 0 Manager  23 0 Co/Managing Co 50 1 
Owners 33 0 Owner 23 0 Owner 24 0 
Company 17 1 Operators 9 0 Operator 8 0 
BRManagement  17 0 BRManagement   0 0 BRManagement  34 0 
Agent 3 1 Agent 6 0 Operation man. 12 0 
Not Specified 2 0 Not Specified 3 0 Not Specified 1 0 
Total 137 2 Total 64 0 Total 129 1 
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largest numbers of different roles and titles, constituting 65 organisations/positions/ranks 
(see Chart 1).  
 
Chart - 1 showing number of Ranks and Positions connected with 30 collision cases 
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As with the SL and the ML/OL there are some causes within the reports which were not 
specifically discussed in relation to specific individuals or organisational responsibilities 
but nevertheless clearly hinted at these. For example; “No formal guidance was given to 
pilots concerning the capabilities and limitations of tugs in the port” and “Had the 
locating beacon not been corroded and had functioned correctly, it might have …” and 
“large majority of vessels transiting choose tracks which run parallel and close. This 
causes bunching of traffic in this area” and “The reported … unreliability of buoyage, 
probably adversely affected confidence” and “Many fishing vessels display lights and 
shapes to indicate that they are engaged in fishing when on passage, and it is not 
surprising that many seafarers are becoming increasingly sceptical of their validity”.  
 
Despite the fact that there are clearly a large number of organisations at the BOL which 
are implicated in the shipping accidents considered (65 different organisations ), 
nevertheless, BOL organisations do not receive a great deal of emphasis in the main 
bodies of the reports of accident investigators. 
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Table 4 - showing total aggregated results for 30 Collision cases 
 
If we move away from a consideration of the number of times individual ranks are 
mentioned to data related to causation, the picture changes dramatically. The 22 members 
of the operational level are mentioned 5507 times in the reports and 226 times as a cause 
of accidents. This compares to 404 mentions of Beyond Organizational level members 
and only 15 mentions of Beyond Organizational level members as causes of accidents. 
This clearly shows the emphasis on the operational level in their presence in the report 
and in attribution of cause.  
 
Emphasis on the Operational Level can also be noticed in the use of repetition within 
reports. The content analysis findings identified 108 instances of repetition of cause 
(Table 4). For example, in one section of one report the following repetitions were 
identified: “the chief officer relieved the master on the bridge; about thirty minutes later 
he fell asleep” and “The chief officer fell asleep through fatigue”, and “The chief officer 
was alone on the bridge”. 
 
In order to provide further clarification in relation to the content analysis findings of the 
aggregated results which I have presented so far, I thought it useful to present an 
illustration of the findings using an individual collision case as a specific example of the 
tendencies identified. This allows for the further examination of the kind of language used 
in the reports and the ways in which explanations of accident causation were developed or 
obscured.  
 
 
Levels No of Ranks 
mentioned 
No of times 
mentioned 
Mentioned as a 
cause 
Repetition 
Investico 1, 2 & 3 1, 2 & 3 1, 2 & 3 1, 2 & 3 
Op. L 22 23.7% 5507 88.3% 226 92.6% 108 98.2% 
S. L. 1 1.0% 3 0.01% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
ML/OL 5 5.4% 324 5.2% 3 1.2% 2 1.8% 
B.O.L. 65 69.9% 404 6.5% 15 6.1% 0 0.0% 
Total 93 6238 244 110 
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Investigation of a collision between a passenger ferry and a private vessel 
 
The selected report relates to a collision that occurred between a Passenger Ferry (31 
crew members and 71 passengers) and a Private Launch (2 crew members) in 2005. It 
would appear that the Private Launch impeded the safe passage of the Passenger Ferry 
whilst navigating in a narrow channel. In brief, when the Private Launch was about 0.8 
miles ahead of the passenger vessel, its lights were detected and when it was 0.6 miles 
ahead of the passenger vessel, the Master of the Passenger Ferry turned the control wheel 
to alter course about 10 degrees to starboard and sounded 5 short blasts. It seems that 
soon after the whistle signal, the Private Launch altered course to port in front of the 
Passenger Ferry which was still turning to starboard. The Master of the Passenger Ferry 
realised that a collision was imminent and adjusted the control wheel further to starboard 
and the engine controls to full astern. However, the bridge team onboard the Passenger 
Ferry lost sight of the Launch and although they did not hear or feel the impact, they 
realised, when wreckage was seen, that the two vessels had collided. The accident 
resulted in one fatality - the skipper of the Private Launch - and injuries to his partner. In 
addition, the Private Launch was a total loss (split in half) and some minor damage 
occurred to the Passenger Ferry.  
 
The report into this accident contains a highly detailed narrative and descriptive 
information relating to the two ships. It includes details of their design and actions as well 
as personal information relating to the crew (including their certification), and actions that 
were taken well before the collision. The report contains clear details of the circumstances 
surrounding the collision, topography and local traffic, climatic conditions, medical 
pathology and toxicology for the Master of the Passenger Ferry and the Skipper of the 
Private Launch. The report also includes details of Nation State District Council Bylaws. 
It is worth noting that this was the third accident of this kind to have occurred in this 
Maritime Administration’s waters in the previous three years.  
 
 
Content analysis results - Factual Information Section  
 
The data provided in the Factual Information Section of accident investigation reports 
vary in their importance. In order to provide a sense of the less important and the most 
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important details and how they are reported and to give life to the content analysis 
findings, two quotes from the report are selected. The first quote from the Factual 
Information Section states:  
“The actual times involved in the collision sequence were less 
important to the accident than the chronological order of events. 
The most reliable record of the order of events was the playback of 
the ENC log files; consequently this report uses the times from that 
system. The ENC computer was about one minute slow compared 
with the times recorded in the logbook, and 2 minutes 4 seconds 
slow compared with those from the GPS.”  
The second quote from this section states:  
“There was no requirement in any [Country name] legislation 
requiring a person in command of a private boat to be qualified, or 
to have had any training, or for the boat itself to be registered. The 
[Country name] District Council Navigation Bylaws 2002 sections 
[number] did require that a person operating a powered boat 
capable of a proper speed of 10 knots be over 15 years of age.” 
 
Here we see that although the first quote implies the presence of time errors these are 
actually of no significance to the investigation and have no direct or even indirect bearing 
on the accident. Yet, the detail provided of the one minute slow and the two minute four 
seconds slow in the first paragraph of the Factual Information Section serves to lend a 
spurious thoroughness to the investigation as well as focusing attention upon the 
Operational Level. On the other hand, the second quote which might be seen to be of 
central interest to the investigation is not presented as such. Rather it is obscured within 
seven pages of detailed quotations from National Bylaws and International Rules and 
Regulations. Such National Bylaws, International Rules and Regulations are very well 
known to qualified, trained and licensed mariners, not to mention legislators themselves. 
Their presence in the report serves to do little more than undermine the significance of the 
finding in relation to the collision and the Private Launch. 
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Table 5 - shows content analysis results of the Factual Information Section 
Levels  Indicators from MAIR Quantifier 
Ranks/Positions/ Organisations 
Involved 
Possible indication No. of times As a cause 
Master   48  
Second officer  26  
Cadet   22  
Engineer   1  
Second engineer  1  
Bridge team  4  
Crew   3  
Helmsman/Lookout  3  
Op.L. 
Skipper   23  
BRM  11  
Shipping company   1  
M.L./O.L. 
Owner   2  
B.O.L. District council   1  
 
The content analysis results for this Factual Information Section identify the Ranks, 
Positions and Organisations mentioned in the report of this collision case with no 
attribution of cause (Table 5). In this particular report the factual information section 
avoids attributing causes altogether. However, in describing the sequence of events, the 
results clearly show an emphasis on the OpL. When we look at the other levels we see 
that:  
- The Supervisory Level is missing in terms of a consideration of both the 
Passenger Ferry and the Private Launch.  
- There is limited reference to the Management Level. The Bridge 
Resources Management (BRM) can be categorised as ML/OL which 
refers to the management within the Passenger Ferry (Master, Bridge 
team and Bridge Resources Management quotes in detail). There is one 
mention of the “shipping company” meaning the management company 
of that Passenger ferry. There are two mentions of the “Owner” which 
refer to the former Owner (on one occasion) and the skipper/owner of the 
private Launch (on one occasion).  
- The sole mention of the District Council in the BOL refers to the national 
Bylaws quoted and provided by the nation state.  
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Thus analysis of the Factual Information Section, illustrates the fairly typical emphasis 
placed in MAIRs upon a detailed description of OpL ranks and their actions alongside the 
mention of other relevant information such as relevant National Bylaws, International 
Rules and Regulations. 
 
 
Content analysis results - Analysis Section  
 
In the Analysis Section of the MAIR for this incident some of the actions of related parties 
were analysed. However, to highlight some of the important points relating to the 
investigation, the section (Point One) begins by stating that the Nation States District 
Council’s Navigation Bylaws of 2002 were quite clear. That is, firstly, small vessels shall 
not impede the passage of large vessels and that it was reasonable for the Master of the 
Passenger Ferry to expect that the Private Launch would not impede his progress. 
Secondly, Maritime Rules section “Narrow Channels” as quoted in the report (Point 
Two) required that vessels of less than 20 meters shall not impede the progress of vessels 
that can only navigate within a narrow channel or fairway. However the report further 
explains that while there was no definition of what constitutes a narrow channel, the 
confined waters of the collision area could well be considered narrow for vessels of the 
size of the Passenger Ferry.  
 
Thirdly, the Private Launch which was 10 meters long did not have radar reflective 
material and therefore wasn’t clearly identifiable by the Passenger ferry (Point Five) in 
addition, the lights of the Private Launch might have been difficult to see (Point Six). 
Interestingly (Point Eleven) states that neither vessel actually determined whether a risk 
of collision existed by taking relative bearings either visually or by radar and that the 
Passenger Ferry did have an ARPA facility, but when the target of the Private Launch 
was established there would not have been enough time to engage the ARPA and get any 
meaningful information from it. Furthermore the report states that had the Passenger 
Ferry’s speed been reduced (Private Launch 0.8 miles away and closing speed was 24 
knots when detected), there would have been slightly more time to better evaluate the 
situation and react accordingly. On the other hand (Point Twelve), had the skipper of the 
Private Launch reacted by increasing engine speed and altered course to starboard rather 
than to port the collision might have been avoided.  
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These points serve to illustrate the extent to which the investigation tried to locate causes 
for the collision within the operational level. After a considerable journey through these 
operational details the report finally states (Point Twenty):  
“At the time of the accident, [Country] had no requirement for 
private boats to be registered or their skippers to be qualified, 
trained or licensed. The only law pertaining to the operator of a 
private boat was contained in the Bylaws, which required a person 
in control of a boat that could exceed 10 knots to be over 15 years 
of age. Consequently, it was possible for an untrained person to be 
in charge of a private vessel of any size and power. Such a situation 
resulted in masters of large and generally less manoeuvrable 
vessels being unsure whether the skipper of a small boat knows the 
collision regulations and whether the appropriate action will be 
taken not to impede the larger vessel.” 
In addition, (Point Twenty Two):  
“Having no registration or compulsory identification marking on 
private boats made administering the Bylaws and collision 
regulations difficult. The virtual anonymity of private boats also 
reinforced the belief by masters of larger ships that little 
improvement would be gained by reporting every close-quarter 
incident that occurred.” 
 
These paragraphs clearly indicate that the accident might well be attributed in major part 
to the lack of adequate regulation pertaining to small private vessels. The report 
acknowledges that the Master had stated that he had reported several similar close-quarter 
incidents but the authorities had taken no action. This statement and the apparent lack of 
action taken in relation to the Master’s report were not however further considered in the 
report. The report in addition does not elaborate on how the points made within its pages 
and relating to his actions could have been expected to be understood/appreciated by the 
skipper of the Private Launch, given that there were no requirements for him to possess or 
have received qualifications, licensing or training as stated.  
 
The content analysis results for the Analysis Section again illustrate the emphasis on the 
Operational Level (Table 6). This is quite clear in the number of times the OpL ranks are 
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mentioned. Of most importance is the reference to the skipper of the Private Launch “if 
altered course to starboard rather than port the collision might have been avoided”. In 
addition,  the lack of consideration and emphasis given to the statement made by the 
Master of the Passenger Ferry that the authorities had “not taken any action” when he had 
previously reported close-quarter incidents with private boats is very telling.  
 
Table 6 – shows content analysis results of the Analysis Section 
Levels Indicators from MAIR Quantifier 
Ranks/Positions/ Organisations Possible indication No. of times As cause 
Master   26  
Second officer  5  
Cadet   6  
Second engineer  1  
Bridge team  7  
Crew   4  
Helmsman   6  
OPL. 
Skipper  - if altered course to starboard 
rather than port the collision 
might have been avoided  
23  1 
M.L./O.L. BRM  2  
District council   2  B.O.L. 
Authorities  - Had not taken any action 1  1 
 
 
Content analysis results - Conclusion Section 
 
The results of the Conclusion Section begin by stating that the findings are listed in order 
of development (chronological order) and not in order of priority. Nonetheless, for 
example, the sequence of points is as follows:  
“1 - The 2 vessels collided just south of [place name] shortly after 
1911, but the precise position and time could not be determined.” 
“2 - The Skipper of the Private Launch did not suffer any major 
physical trauma in the accident, but drowned following the 
collision between the 2 vessels.” 
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“3 - The Private Launch impeded the progress of the Passenger 
Ferry in contradiction to the Navigation Bylaws and the collision 
regulations.” 
“4 - Prior to the collision the vessels were approaching each other 
on nearly reciprocal courses.” 
 
With respect to chronology it is clear that these points should have been in the point order 
4 – 3 – 1 then 2. This chaotic pattern continues however as is clear in the order of the 
following points which would be more logically ordered as 17-16-14 then 15:  
“14 - There was no specific legislation requiring private boat 
operators to be trained or certified, or for their boats to be 
registered or certified seaworthy.” 
“15 - The high density of traffic in the waters of the [place name] 
gave rise to frequent close-quarter situations. Although bylaws and 
collision regulations were in place, it was almost impossible to 
police such a large area effectively, particularly when private boats 
were unregistered and unlikely to be identifiable, thus reducing the 
likelihood of their being called to account for contraventions of the 
legislation.” 
“16 - Drugs and alcohol did not contribute to the collision.” 
“17 - More effective BRM on the Passenger Ferry might have 
allowed the bridge team to better evaluate and react to the 
situation.” 
 
Clearly this is neither laid out in order of development nor in order of priority, neither 
does it conform to any known accident causation model. Furthermore, and most 
importantly, the content analysis findings of this section demonstrate once again the 
emphasis on the OpL which I have identified as typical in my overall analysis (Table 7).  
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Table 7 - shows content analysis results of the Conclusion Section 
Levels Indicators from MAIR Quantifier 
Ranks/Positions/ Organisations 
Involved 
Possible indication No. of times As a cause 
Skipper  altered course to port rather 
than starboard 
5 1 
Master   4  
Second officer   1  
OP.L. 
Bridge team  1  
ML/OL BRM  1  
B.O.L. Not specified No specific legislation req. 
boat operators to be certified 
and trained 
1 1 
 
 
Content analysis results - Recommendation Section 
 
The Recommendation Section of this report stands in contrast to the previous sections 
with a sharp shift in emphasis away from the Operational Level. It consists of two parts:  
previous safety recommendations and final safety recommendations.  
The previous safety recommendations relate to the investigation of two similar cases 
which occurred in 1999 and 2001. They take the form of reported correspondence 
between Investico Three (the maritime investigation board concerned) and the Director of 
Maritime Safety, the Pleasure Boat Safety Advisory Group (PBAG) and the Manager of 
Recreational Boating. These Recommendations state:  
“In line with the recommendations made by the Pleasure Boat 
Safety Advisory Group in 1999, continue to monitor for the five-
year period to December 2004, the impact of education initiatives 
introduced in [Nation State], against set safety targets. Further, that 
the systems of compulsory boating safety education in the [another 
Nation State] and other jurisdictions, continue to be monitored for 
success through the same period, with a view to implementation of 
such a system in [Nation State].” 
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The PBAG reply was:  
“Recommendation [number/year] is a continuous action in support 
of other initiatives now in place to address accidents in the 
recreational sector.” 
 
The Manager of Recreational Boating informed Investico Three that: 
We are reviewing the Pleasure Boat Safety Advisory Group report 
at this time after 5 years in effect. The draft review is largely 
complete and will be considered at the Dec 2005 meeting of the 
National Pleasure Boat Safety Forum. All recommendations in the 
report have been examined and I would be happy to send you a 
copy once the draft has been looked at by the Forum and their 
collective input is included, decisions regarding where we go will 
be made May 2006 when the Forum meets again.” 
“The purpose of the review is to look to the future and also to look 
at what has been done from the PBSAG recommendations and how 
effective this has been, especially in preventing fatalitie s.” 
 
On the basis of these recommendations Investico Three noted that these recommendations 
are equally applicable to the current accident and they await its outcome (December 
2005).   
 
Two final safety recommendations were made by Investico Three. These were directed to 
the Director of Maritime Safety and the Passenger Ferry Shipping Company. The first 
recommendation is to determine the feasibility of private boats being registered, marked 
accordingly and required to meet the requirements of minimum standard seaworthiness. 
However, the Director of Maritime Safety replied that “This recommendation will be 
included as an agenda item for discussion at the next meeting of the National Pleasure 
Boat Safety Forum. The next scheduled meeting of the forum is in May 2006”. They 
noted however that the fitting of radar reflector is often impracticable. 
 
The second recommendation was to the Shipping Company Managing Director requiring 
the company to put in place procedures to reinforce the need for effective Bridge 
Resource Management onboard the company’s ships. This recommendation, although 
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directed to the ML/OL, was not strongly supported by causes presented in the previous 
three sections of the report.  
 
Table 8 – shows content analysis results of the Recommendation Section 
Levels Indicators from MAIR Quantifier 
Ranks/Positions/ Organisations 
Involved 
Possible indication No. of times As a cause 
ML/OL 
 
Company managing 
director 
 2  
 BRM  2  
Director of Maritime 
safety 
 4  
Pleasure Boat Safety 
advisory group 
 2  
Manager of recreational 
boating 
 1  
Pleasure boat safety 
authority 
 1  
The Commission  2  
B.O.L. 
Strait managing director  1  
 
 
The content analysis demonstrates that BOL organisations are introduced and addressed 
throughout the recommendations (Table 8) suggesting that in fact they are considered by 
the authors of the report to be key to the avoidance of further similar accidents. 
Furthermore, OpL ranks whilst continually emphasised in the main body of the report and 
other report sections were absent from this crucial section. 
 
The findings from the content analysis of this collision case, as with other cases, show 
that the Operational Level is made central in the process of the investigation and 
reporting. The first two sections of the MAIR Factual Information and Analysis lay out 
and analyse in detail all of the information, Bylaws, Rules and Regulations relating to the 
Operational Level and detail in minutia actions of the relevant crew members. In addition, 
the Conclusion Section is neither presented in chronological order nor in order of 
importance allowing ambiguity to creep in to the interpretation of the accident and its 
causes.  
 
The report’s Recommendations Section however contrasts with the main body of the 
report. Whereas in the other sections of the report the BOL organisations mentioned are 
not discussed as part of the cause of the accident, within the recommendations section it is 
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possible to infer that BOL organisations have been interpreted by the author as being 
implicated in the causes of the accident. Clearly the recommendations are made in the 
hope that they will prevent a reoccurrence of similar accidents. Thus the 
recommendations can reasonably be understood as an attempt to address the underlying 
causes or contributing causes of the accident. The Operational Level ranks were missing 
from the Recommendation Section in spite of being the entire focus of the first three 
sections of the report.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Content analysis as a method utilised for analysing the accident reports demonstrated that 
reports strongly focus on the operational level and activities at the “sharp end”. A 
common feature of all reports was the inclusion of highly detailed and sometimes 
repetitive narratives and descriptions relating to the operational level whilst in relation to 
the higher levels elaboration, and analyses of actions and inaction, was notably absent. On 
a number of occasions there were also some activities relating to Beyond the 
Organisational Level organisations which might be expected to be described in the reports 
and which were neglected. This was made particularly clear in the analysis of the reports’ 
recommendation sections where there tended to be a sharp shift from addressing the 
operational level to addressing the upper levels. Moreover, the content analysis 
demonstrated that there was no follow up of recommendations made in previous cases.  
 
The findings also demonstrated that a unified format is not utilised in reporting accidents 
in the maritime industry. This was made clear by the lack of chronological order, lack of 
organisational level order and/or lack of priority order used in structuring reports. In 
many instances there were shifts between levels and back again in the presentation of 
information, analysis and conclusions presented in the reports. 
 
Contemporary accepted and respected theoretical models of accident causation emphasise 
that accidents are complex events. They do not occur simply as a result of a single 
problem or shortcomings relating to workers at the operational level (seafarers). The 
study of such models - lastly Reason 1997 - showed that there are chains of events which 
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are usually triggered at the highest level in the organisation creating latent conditions 
which may ultimately result in accidents.  
 
If Reason’s model relating to accident causation is valid, then it may be that one of the 
explanations for the repeated occurrence of similar accidents within the maritime sector is 
the tendency for maritime accident investigation reports to place an emphasis, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, on the operational level when reporting causation rather 
than upon the underlying causes of accidents which are frequently embedded in the 
supervisory, managerial, and beyond organisation levels. There may be a number of 
explanations for such emphasis and these are not the focus of consideration here. What is 
important is to highlight the extent to which the repeated mention of operational level 
personnel in reports of accidents (even when they are not regarded by reporters as 
associated with causing the accident) and the omission, or only brief mention, of 
individuals and bodies at other levels serves to produce a strong impression that causation 
may be identified by focusing upon the actions of operational level personnel (such as 
Masters and officers on watch) and that it is these that need to be addressed. In fact in 
many reports the authors reveal, in relation to their specific recommendations, that it is 
not the actions of individuals alone that need to be attended to but procedures, regulations, 
management, and supervision. Regrettably because such recommendations do not emerge 
from the accounts given in the main bodies of the reports it may be that key stakeholders 
overlook their centrality and that readers of the reports are nevertheless left with the 
impression that what is at fault in any given case is an individual or a number of 
individual seafarers. This emphasis on the individual may lead to a failure to address the 
systemic causes of many accidents particularly when such failures lie within shipping 
organisations whose managers may not have close contact with regulators or maritime 
investigators and may rely solely upon their own reading and understanding of accident 
investigation reports in seeking to better understand the causes of the accidents which they 
seek to avoid.     
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Supply chains and best practice in the management of health and 
safety at sea 
 
 
David Walters 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the role of supply chains in influencing health and safety 
management. It draws on a recent review of research findings on the subject more 
generally and considers their relevance to managing health and safety in the maritime 
industry. 
 
The paper outlines findings concerning the direct and indirect effects of supply chain 
business strategies on health and safety arrangements and outcomes. While it reveals 
a remarkable lack of systematic and rigorous evidence on the way in which the 
internal dynamics of supply chains impact on health and safety management and 
performance, it suggests that the broad thrust of the literature points to the negative 
impact of these strategies on the health and safety of many of the workers involved. 
At the same time it identifies some strategies that target supply chains as a focus for 
improving arrangements for health and safety in modern business practice. The paper 
discusses these in terms of their effectiveness, and coverage and considers the drivers 
behind their implementation.  
 
Although most of the research that has considered supply chain management and 
health and safety is focused on economic sectors other than the maritime industry, this 
paper argues that many related findings can be applied to the industry and are relevant 
to understandings of the way in which the current organisation of work in the 
maritime industry impacts on health and safety  
 
The study on which the paper is based was funded by the Institution of Occupational 
Safety and Health (IOSH) and undertaken jointly by Cardiff and Oxford Brookes 
Universities.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Traditional approaches to improving the work environment and protecting the health 
and safety of workers have relied on the development, implementation and operation 
of employers’ legal duties located within the framework of law governing relations 
between employers and their employees. Such requirements often originate in 
discourse involving economic actors representing the interests labour and capital, 
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mediated by political processes, leading to legislative standards and arrangements to 
seek compliance with them through the intervention of state regulatory inspection 
agencies. However, current approaches to achieving best practice in occupational 
health and safety have developed against a background of quite fundamental change 
in the structure and organisation of work and its regulatory, political and economic 
contexts. Such change as has come to characterise the so called ‘new economy’ 
globally. The maritime industry is widely regarded as a sector in which (for a host of 
reasons to do with its economic structure and organisation, its global reach and the 
limitations of both international regulation and organised labour) the impact of these 
changes is comparatively advanced.  
 
In this scenario, established norms that influence the way in which health and safety 
management is conducted across a whole range of economic sectors are 
acknowledged to no longer hold sway in the same ways they did when traditional 
approaches to its governance and regulation were developed. Instead, where these 
approaches are seen to have failed, or to be no longer relevant, business practices and 
market regulation are increasingly seen as containing the appropriate drivers to 
stimulate and sustain best practice on health and safety at work. Business 
relationships operating within supply chains are an example frequently cited as 
possessing such capacity. Here again, while such features are common to many 
economic sectors, the maritime industry is in many ways an extreme case. In this 
paper I examine the evidence for the role of supply chains in health and safety and the 
claims made for it, with a particular focus on their relevance to improving health and 
safety management practices in the maritime industry.  
 
 
To do so, it is first important to establish what I mean by supply chains and their 
effects and secondly why they are especially significant at the present time. Having 
done this, I consider the effects of an increased business focus on supply chains for 
the health and safety of the workers involved — in the maritime industry and 
elsewhere. In this part of the paper I outline some findings of a recent review of the 
research literature on supply chains and health and safety – considering both positive 
and negative effects — before turning to examine the implications of these findings 
for the future of health and safety at sea. 
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What are supply chains and why are they so important for health and safety 
management at the present time?  
 
Supply chains describe business relationships in which goods and services are 
produced, bought and sold, and increasingly, the logistics necessary to maximise the 
flow of these processes. They cover simple transactions between buyers and suppliers 
as well as complex arrangements in which there may be multiple links in supply 
chains. Most business organisations are likely to be located within a nexus of buying 
and supplying relationships for goods and services that may be quite different in 
character according to the nature of the goods or services involved. They will, 
therefore, be likely to be involved in multiple supply chains and engage at different 
levels within each.  
 
This has pretty much always been the case, but current business and organisational 
practices have served to increase the importance of supply chains to business strategy 
as well as within national and global economies. A range of wider economic and 
regulatory factors have also influenced the evolution of these practices, including 
developments in information technology and logistics, neo- liberal economic, political 
and regulatory strategies, and the related withdrawal of the state from command and 
control regulation, reduced power and influence of organised labour, weakening of 
the traditional employer-employee contractual relationship, and the increasing 
prominence of so-called ‘porous organisations’ and flexible work patterns (See for 
example, Kersley et al 2006, Millward et al 1992, Wiggins 2002, Colling 2005). 
Conceptually, these changes can be viewed as comprising developments that have 
served to make outsourcing more feasible for organisations and those that have driven 
it in ‘business terms’. 
 
At the general level, a central feature of the growing importance of supply chains in 
the production and delivery of goods and services, and hence the outsourcing on 
which this growth has been built, is the way in which it has involved a move by 
organisations to place less reliance on ‘management through hierarchy’. In effect, this 
growth has encompassed a move towards the wider adoption of decentred and 
fragmented forms of management control that are more directly based on, and 
informed by, market logics and dynamics.  
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Supply chains and health and safety in maritime transport 
 
In this scenario transport industries occupy a particularly significant position. On the 
one hand they, like many business organisations in other sectors, have sought to 
maximise their business advantage by manipulating features of supply chains to 
improve their profitability, efficiency and market position. On the other, they are also 
a key element in providing the logistics efficiencies that have helped make the focus 
on supply chains attractive to business in the first place.  
 
Both these factors impact on health and safety. The first, as in other sectors, has 
especially involved a shift to greater use of outsourced labour supply in transport. In 
road transport for example, studies of accidents have drawn attention to the link 
between unsafe driving and work patterns imposed upon drivers through sub-
contracting in the industry (Belzer 1994; Belzer 2000, Braver et al 1999, Mayhew and 
Quinlan 2006, Johnstone et al 2006). Negative health and safety effects of 
fragmentation and contracting out are not confined to the private sector, but feature in 
the public sector too as Danish research on bus drivers has shown (Netterstrom and 
Hansen 2000, Hasle 2007). Similarly, in rail transport there have been several major 
accidents, resulting in significant loss of life, that have been linked to multi-
contracting in the supply of services. Less well known, is the toll of injury and 
fatalities suffered by the railway workers caught up in such changes of business 
practice (Baldry 2006).  
 
However, maritime transport represents perhaps the most extreme example of a 
fragmented relationship between labour supply and company operation in transport. 
Here, the last two decades have witnessed major changes in both the nature of the 
labour force, its relationship with the ownership of ships and the way in which work 
in the industry is organised. Even though the largest share of ownership of the 
industry remains within the so-called ‘embedded maritime states’ of Europe and 
North America, its labour force does not. As is well known, the large majority of the 
more than one million seafarers working on merchant ships worldwide now comes 
from a small number of southern hemisphere countries such as the Philippines, India  
and China and from former communist Eastern Europe. They are recruited through 
crewing agencies on short-term contracts and work on ships managed by ship 
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management companies (Alderton et al 2004). This is a vivid illustration of a labour 
supply chain, in which the outsourcing allows buyers to contract labour at favourable 
prices and thereby reduce costs and raise their profitability. But the working 
conditions experienced by this outsourced and largely non-unionised labour force are 
extreme by land-based standards, involving long working hours, shift work and 
intensive work patterns as well as serious physical hazards (Bloor et al 2000, Nielsen 
and Roberts 1999). At the same time, the organisation of the labour process for 
seafarers has changed profoundly, with simultaneous drives towards work 
intensification through the employment of smaller crews and the operation of faster 
ships. A response to this shift in labour supply is found in requirements for seafarers 
to be in possession of particular qualifications in an effort to ensure standards of 
competence in the new, outsourced labour force. However as Bloor and Sampson 
(forthcoming) have vividly demonstrated in their study of training provision and off-
shoring, the possibility for abusing this system is considerable 
 
The maritime industry even better illustrates the effects of the second aspect of 
increased business focus on supply — the emphasis on logistics. Key to the success of 
supply chain management is speed and efficiency in transportation. The central role of 
merchant shipping in the logistics of global supply chains has meant that to increase 
profitability, as well as the above changes, the containerisation of goods has taken 
place on a fairly widespread scale in relation to the transportation of non-bulk dry 
cargoes.  This has led to profound changes in operating practices and the redesign 
(and relocation) of ports to achieve shorter times spent in loading and unloading 
cargoes (DeSombre 2006, Kahveci and Nichols 2006, ILO 2001). Arguably the 
consequences of these changes are seen in the way in which occupational mortality 
and morbidity rates for seafaring remain among the highest for all occupations 
(Roberts 2000, Roberts and Marlow 2005). They are further seen in the high 
incidence of shipping incidents ascribed to seafarer fatigue, and the range of psycho-
social health effects caused by working patterns and the social isolation experienced 
among seafarers, both at sea and in modern port facilities ILO/WHO 1996, 
Wadsworth et al 2006).  
 
Chartering arrangements further demonstrate the way in which a business focus on 
supply chain management helps to disrupt the legally constituted relationship between 
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employer and employee, on which, as in other industries, most approaches to the 
safety management of ships are based, with results that sometimes lead to serious 
incidents to ships and threaten the safety of seafarers. For example, as Sampson 
(2008) describes in her analysis of the effects of the direct relationship between a 
charterer and the captain of a ship (Kodima) involved in a major incident at sea, how 
direct pressures from charterers can lead captains to undertake actions that are against 
their professional judgement. How frequently the commercial interests of charterers, 
which demand a speedy delivery of goods, feature in the underlying causes of such 
major incidents is not known and would be worthy of further investigation. However 
the essential point here is that it represents a situation typical of the growth in ‘porous 
organisations’ in which buyers are able to deal directly with the employees of the 
company with which they have commercial contracts and, in so doing, impose 
demands on them that are based on these commercial interests. This circumvents a 
legal relationship determined in the cont ract of employment, which is the basis for 
employer responsibilities for health and safety and the primary driver for health and 
safety management at sea as elsewhere. Such situations therefore undermine the 
theoretical protection for seafarers provided by these responsibilities and the systems 
they engender, make the implementation of systematic approaches to health and 
safety management more difficult to achieve in practice and increase the vulnerability 
of seafarers.  
 
The logistics revolution that has enabled the ‘efficiency successes’ of supply chains 
management in the maritime sector has not only had a profound impact on the 
structure and organisation of the life and work of seafarers but also on that of 
dockworkers and related labour Bonacich and Wilson 2008).   
 
While some dockworkers and their trade unions (such as those on the West Coast of 
the US) have managed to hold onto a favourable labour market position in the 
logistics revolution, it is evident that this has not been the achievement of all 
dockworkers. Even where it has been the case, it has by no means prevented the 
considerable job- losses that have accompanied the port redesign and relocation that 
has occurred on a major scale in North America, Europe and elsewhere in recent 
decades.  Moreover, such redesign has led, not only to changes to facilitate 
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containerisation, but also to widespread change in port design generally, with 
specialist terminals for handling oil, chemicals and other cargoes.  
 
What all these developments have in common is a focus on speed, efficiency and 
economy in the carriage of cargo. Their results have had major implications for the 
dockside labour force, with a significant reduction in the number of workers involved, 
destruction of docklands social communities and, for those fortunate enough to be 
retained in work, relocation of workplaces to ‘transport hubs’, sometimes 
considerable distances away from previous worksites and major changes in the nature 
and level of intensification of the work involved. As a result, with a much reduced 
labour force and technological development, the overall incidence of harm from the 
hard physical labour associated with the work of loading and unloading ships could be 
anticipated to have reduced in scale. But as is evident from the incidence of major and 
fatal accidents, in fact, the work remains hazardous and the occurrence of serious and 
fatal injuries continues to be a problem – as does the hidden health effects of all these 
changes on the populations affected by them.  
 
For seafarers too, the redesign and relocation of ports adds not only to the 
intensification of work but also to social isolation, as they are no longer able to enjoy 
the extent of shore leave that was once the norm, nor are many of the ports in which 
their ships berth found near the centre of cities today. The result is a further 
contribution to the institutionalised and isolated lifestyles of seafarers, which has been 
noted to contribute to poor mortality and morbidity outcomes.  
 
Wider evidence of the impact of supply chains on health and safety at work 
 
While the maritime industry represents a fairly extreme case, none of these examples 
from maritime transport are particularly surprising if the wider literature on the 
consequences of the business focus on supply chains is considered. In their recent 
review of over 250 studies, Walters and James (2009) found they pointed 
overwhelmingly to poorer working conditions, seen as  ‘indirect’ consequences of 
supply chain management arising, in the main, from the manipulation of price and 
delivery conditions by those in powerful market positions within supply chains, and 
from the complex and fragmented webs of relations between contractors and 
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subcontractors, also often the product of outsourcing, who are engaged at the same 
worksites.  
 
They report studies from a host of industries including construction, chemicals, motor 
manufacturing, telecommunications, the nuclear industry, food production and 
processing, textiles and footwear (as well as the studies in the various branches of 
transport already mentioned). Insofar as evidence on the health and safety effects of 
supply chains was identified in these studies they noted that it took three main forms: 
 
· Analyses which explore, conceptually and on the basis of secondary evidence, the  
potential for outsourcing, and hence supply chains, to have adverse health and 
safety effects; 
· Empirical findings which shed light on the propensity for workers employed in 
sub-contracting organisations, or on types of employment commonly associated 
with the growing use of outsourcing, to experience work -related ill health and 
injuries; 
· Empirical explorations of the way in which the operation of supply chains in 
particular sectoral settings impacts on the working conditions of those who work 
for supplier organisations.   
 
These sources of evidence, both individually and in combination, provided 
considerable support for the view that the dynamics of supply chains frequently lead 
to adverse health and safety effects. They also show how these effects are intimately 
connected to the way in which such dynamics serve to exert downward cost pressures 
on suppliers, thereby leading them to adopt more intensified and casualised 
employment regimes, and, more generally, act to engender poorer quality, and more 
fragmented, health and safety management arrangements.  
 
For example greater control by market and related mechanisms in recent decades has 
led to significant changes affecting work organisation including 
restructuring/downsizing by large private and public sector employers and consequent 
effects on work intensity via changes to staffing levels/workloads, multi-tasking, 
increased hours of work/presenteeism and unpaid overtime, decline in the proportion 
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of the workforce in full-time permanent employment (especially for males) and 
increased part-time, temporary, fixed term and leased (agency) work, elaborate 
national/international supply chains and growing use of (multi-tiered) subcontractors 
and agency workers. Outsourcing in the private and public sector has led to growth of 
self-employment, growth in micro businesses and in the number of small business 
employers. Subcontracting/franchising as well as use of IT has facilitated the growth 
(sometimes re-emergence) of home-based work, remote, transient (such as short term 
call centres) & telework. There are further associations with increases in multiple job-
holding — often associated with part-time and temporary work (Louie et al 2006). 
 
Such findings are not exclusive to small firms and apply equally or even more so in 
the case of precarious forms of employment such as result from the supply of labour 
through employment agencies, through labour leasing or through subcontracting, 
Quinlan et al (2001) reviewed nearly 100 studies that had used indices such as injury 
rates, sickness absence rates, occurrence of cardiovascular disease, and knowledge of 
legal rights and responsibilities in OHS, as well as subjective measures of health 
outcomes. Nearly 80 per cent found an association between the type of employment in 
question and adverse health outcomes. In a more recent review that updated and 
applied more robust selection methods and quality criteria to the studies reviewed, the 
same authors confirmed these earlier findings and OHS was found to have been 
adversely affected in an even larger majority of relevant studies (Quinlan and Bohle 
2008). Quinlan and his colleagues (2001) have argued that the economic pressures 
and reward systems encountered in these forms of employment result in poorer health 
and safety outcomes than might be anticipated in more traditional employment 
arrangements, leading them to comment that in ‘any organisation where outsourcing 
has become common, OHS standards deteriorate…’ (Mayhew et al 1996). 
 
There are at least four sets of compelling reasons why the net aggregate effect of 
outsourcing are likely to be adverse that are generally supported by evidence from 
research literature. First, much of the externalisation of work activities has gone to 
smaller organisations, which possess less adequate and sophisticated systems of risk 
management than their larger counterparts and for which there is now substantial 
evidence that both health and safety management and performance is poorer than in 
their larger counterparts (Nichols 1997, Eurostat 2002, Nichols et al 1995, Cully et al 
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1990, Stevens 1999, Walters 2001, 2008). Second, problems arise with regard to the 
co-ordination of such management in situations where sub-contractor and temporary 
staff work in physical proximity to in-house personnel. Third, inter-organisational 
contracting can have a detrimental impact on conventional channels for the 
representation of the interests of workers. (Johnstone et al 2006, Walters and Nichols 
2007). Finally, associated commercial contracts can limit the ability of those 
organisations engaged in the supply of labour or the provision of manufacturing and 
other services to invest in preventive health and safety measures for example, in a 
British study of health and safety in small firms, owner/managers reported how their 
ability to invest in health and safety was limited by the narrow profit margins that 
they were operating under as a result of the contract prices demanded by larger clients 
(Vickers et al 2003). 
 
Evidence from a number of studies further suggests that the co-ordination of risk 
management is problematic in sub-contracting and labour outsourcing because overall 
management control and responsibilities are more diffused in these situations (Wright 
1986, Wright 1994, Baldry 2006, Cullen 2001, Uff 2000, Loos and Le Deaut 2002). 
There is also some evidence to show that the direct and indirect effects that buyers 
have on suppliers can lead them, in turn, to seek similar changes within their own 
suppliers. There would, however, seem to have been surprisingly little detailed 
research undertaken which sheds light on these ‘second tier’, or ‘downstream’ effects, 
either generally or specifically in relation to health and safety elements (Scarborough 
2000, Turnbull et al 1993). 
 
There is also a considerable body of evidence relating the development of the kinds of 
work insecurity, intensification and flexibility typical of the results of supply chain 
pressures, to a variety of adverse health and health related outcomes, including 
increased incidence of cardiovascular disease, burnout and depression, (Kivimaki 
2000) Ferrie et al 2002)  and to poor workplace safety outcomes (Thebaud Mony 
1999, Rouseau and Libuser 1997, Benach et al 2002, Blank 1995, Allan 2002). 
Factors associated with these poor health and safety outcomes again include greater 
job insecurity, poorer pay, lowered access to training among precarious workers, less 
control over working time, which in turn contributes to lack of knowledge and 
awareness of safety issues and complaints about lack of voice (Aronson et al 2002, 
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Draca and Green 2004, Feldman et al 1995, Bohle et al 2004, Walters and Nichols 
2007). 
 
Another way of looking at the impact of these structural changes in employment is to 
examine their influence on the achievement of a ‘positive safety culture’ by 
organisations. Research suggests that such a culture requires good communication, 
trust, the presence of OHS feedback systems and shared perceptions of commitment 
to OHS. Following an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical evidence of 
the likely effects of changing employment relationships on safety attitudes and 
behaviours and their implications for organisational safety culture, Clarke (2003: 49) 
argues:  
An overview of the evidence suggests that organisational restructuring may 
damage the mutual trust between core workers and managers, undermining the 
existing safety culture. Furthermore adding contingent and contract employees 
to the workforce threatens the integrity of the safety culture by further eroding 
the trust of core employees.  
 
In summary then, the vast majority of studies in which the effects of supply chain 
business orientations on health an d safety have been studied demonstrate poor health 
and safety outcomes and a constellation of structural and organisational  reasons why 
they occur. While this work has been undertaken predominantly in land-based 
economic sectors, it strongly supports the findings of the much more limited studies 
on the maritime industry reported earlier and suggests that, if more detailed and robust 
studies were undertaken in the sector, they would be most likely to expose similar 
details of poor health and safety outcomes and similar reasons for them.  
 
A glass half full? — Harnessing supply chain management to improve health and 
safety  
 
Despite this somewhat gloomy scenario, in some of the studies reviewed by Walters 
and James (2009), there is an acknowledgement that the economic relations involved 
may, in certain circumstances, lend support to improved health and safety 
arrangements for individuals or organisations in dependent relationships within 
supply chains. This is as a result of the ability of powerful supply chain actors to 
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require their suppliers to adopt certain specified policies and practices. It is these so 
called ‘direct effects’ that seem to have caught the attention of national regulators and 
policy-makers who are faced with developing strategies for achieving and maintaining 
compliance with health and safety standards and protecting workers in a rapidly 
changing economy. As a result, the supposed positive role of supply chains has 
become increasingly prominent in policy rhetoric concerning ways of reaching, 
supporting and sustaining good health and safety practice within small firms, among 
contractors and subcontractors, and in relation to the safe use of hazardous substances 
and machinery — especially within neo- liberal economic and regulatory constructs. 
They also feature quite extensively in public relations pronouncements concerning 
corporate social responsibility and fair-trading arrangements, especially among 
companies engaged in global trading.  
 
Given their prominence and their clear attractiveness to policy-makers in current 
economic and regulatory scenarios – it is important ask what is the evidence for these 
claims, what are the drivers of good practice and — in relation to the particular focus 
of the present paper – what is the relevance of the answers to these questions for the 
maritime industry.  
 
Attempts to improve health and safety management within supplier organisations vary 
in terms of their form and foci, but broadly encompass, procurement strategies that 
use health and safety standards to select contractors, certification schemes aimed at 
ensuring the competencies of contracting organisations and those working for them, 
and the imposition of requirements relating to the more general management of health 
and safety, including the utilisation of risk assessment and communication within 
multi-contractor/subcontractor work sites. They differ in terms of their level of 
operation, with some operating on an industry/sector basis, and others at the level of 
individual contracting organisations or, as in the case of construction, individual 
projects.  
 
In general, systematic evidence regarding the impact of these types of initiatives is 
weak. Walters and James (2009) nevertheless identified a limited number of examples 
where there had been positive effects on standards of health and safety management 
and performance. None of this evidence comes directly from the maritime industry. 
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Indeed it is mostly restricted to cases in construction, in road transport, food 
production and in the textiles and footwear industries. Nevertheless it describes 
situations for which there are analogous cases in the maritime industry and which 
therefore suggest scope for further investigation.  Essentially, these situations can be 
described under five main headings, each of which is briefly summarised below.  
 
Procurement strategies: In theory, the power wielded by the purchaser of goods or 
services allows client/customers opportunities to influence improvement in health and 
safety management among suppliers. There is some evidence to indicate that 
procurement approaches used to improve health and safety arrangements by large 
construction concerns during major projects meet with some success. For example, 
during the building of the major land works supporting the land/sea link between 
Denmark and southern Sweden in the 1990s, evidence showed that initiatives on 
health and safety requirements in procurement helped to reduce the incidence of 
occupational accidents (EU OSHA 2000). Similar findings were reported in relation to 
the building of Terminal 5 at Heathrow Airport (Ewing 2006). They were prominent 
in the construction of the facilities for the Sydney Olympics – where, Government, 
business and trade unions agreed to collaborate to achieve a number shared objectives 
including ‘the highest possible standards of health and safety’ leading to an exemplary 
performance (Webb 2001) and are currently in use by the Olympic Development 
Authority for the London Olympics (Waterman 2009)  
 
However, other research on procurement practices in construction for example, 
suggests that the achievement of such influence is far from the norm the industry. 
Findings of a survey by Davies Langdon (2007) for instance showed that while clients 
set contractual requirements on health and safety in the procurement of services, they 
were less engaged with efforts to monitor compliance or undertake post-completion 
review of such arrangements. In other words, opportunities to monitor and improve 
supply chain influence were being overlooked— despite its comparatively tight 
regulation the UK.  
 
Research literature on selection issues in the procurement of contractors in 
construction more generally suggests that health and safety, while present, is not 
prominent. Findings in an early study (Hatush and Skitmore 1997) indicated that the 
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most common criteria considered by procurers during the prequalification and bid 
process were ‘those pertaining to financ ial soundness, technical ability, management 
capability, and the health and safety performance of contractors’ (my italics). Most 
studies, however, show that quality record, contractor experience and company 
reputation are the most influential criteria, with tender price exerting the most 
significant influence (Jennings and Holt 1998), while one study on the procurement 
and management of small building works suggested that the CDM Regulations in the 
UK had ‘left ambiguities, primarily through specified exclusions to application, 
through which health and safety responsibilities may be downplayed or even simply 
disregarded’ (Griffith and Phillips 2001). 
Beyond the construction industry, the role of procurement in requiring improved 
health and safety from suppliers is cited in a number of accounts. For example, the 
European Agency for Safety and Health provides an account of the practices in the 
main electricity producing and distributing company in Belgium, where health and 
safety requirements are applied both to the procurement of labour and products (EU 
OSHA, 2000:94-99). This appears to be aided by the presence of national contractor 
certification systems in Belgium that enable the company to choose appropriately 
experienced contractors. 
 
Consideration of health and safety in procurement strategies is also occasionally 
found in relation to products, such as with hazardous substances (Walters 2008) and 
in the hire of power tools in construction (Ponting 2008).  
 
Certification, competency and supply chains: If customers are required to assume 
some responsibility for choosing contractors from among those qualified and 
competent to undertake work safely and without risk to the health, it follows that they 
need information to make appropriate choices. This requirement has stimulated the 
development of certification systems covering both organisational and individual 
health and safety competencies of contractors. For example, the Dutch Sicherheits 
Certifikat Contraktoren (SCC Certificate) used in several EU countries is an example 
of supply chain leverage on contractors to evaluate and certify their OSH and 
environment management systems. It is intended as a means to demonstrate that a 
contractor works in compliance with fundamental statutory requirements. Significant 
improvement has been reported as a result of its development (EU OSHA 2002). But 
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detailed evaluation of the underlying factors influencing its implementation, operation 
and outcomes appears lacking.  
 
In the UK, where similar responsibilities are also the case under the CDM 
Regulations, their downside has also become increasingly evident, especially in 
relation to the over-bureaucratisation of supply chain management. Carpenter (2006) 
for example, provides details of a dozen schemes that are available for assuring 
individual competencies and more than twice this number for assuring organisational 
OHS competence.  Not surprisingly, his report’s recommendations concerns ways of 
standardising these approaches, echoing similar findings from others, such as the 
Better Regulation Unit, which warns of the growth of multiple schemes, and the 
confusion of, bureaucratic burden upon contractors (Better Regulation Unit 2008).   
Nevertheless, there is no sign of the recommended rationalisation occurring.  
 
Inspection, audi ting and monitoring: The importance of the inspection, auditing or 
monitoring of suppliers’ performance in accordance with procurement criteria is 
identified in several of the above accounts. It also features generally in accounts of 
supply chain management influence. Two aspects are particularly pertinent, the first 
being the indication that buyers frequently do not follow through with adequate 
monitoring arrangements and the second, that when they do, they are often over-
bureaucratic. Two HSE research reports that examined health and safety in supply 
chains in three sectors, food processing, health services and private events organising 
(Partnership Sourcing Ltd 2003) and on client/contractor relationships in six different 
economic sectors (Partnership Sourcing Ltd 2006) comment on the tight control — 
including regular audit and inspection — by supermarket chains in relation to food 
hygiene and note the obvious business reasons why this is so. But they further note 
the absence of similar messages in relation to health and safety, thus echoing more in-
depth research into food retail supply chains (see James and Lloyd 2008).  
 
Supply chains and other aspects of health and safety management systems: In 
Germany VW-Audi offers specific support for the management of the hazardous 
substances it supplies to about 2,600 small contractual car-dealers and garages, About 
2,500 different chemical products are available under the VW-Audi label, the use of 
which is prescribed by VW-Audi. There is no published evaluation of the impact of 
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this support, but anecdotal observations suggest dealers and garages rely on it (Sul 
2005 in Walters 2008).  A reason given for this dependency is that the dealers and 
garages are obliged to comply with the quality management system of the company 
and this compliance is checked during annual audits. It is a good example of very 
close and contractually determined association between a large buyer and 
economically dependent dealers and garages allowing the latter little choice but to 
comply in order to retain business.  
The chemical industry utilises supply chains to promote its programmes like 
Responsible Care and Product Stewardship, which concern the sound management of 
safety, health and the environmental effects of products. This necessitates co-
operation between dealers and users and is intended to offer an early warning system 
for safety, health or environmental risks relating to a product, allowing problems to be 
tackled in good time. In theory it should lead to increased trust between suppliers and 
customers and greater confidence throughout the whole product chain, as well as 
acting as a motor for continuous innovation that will enable incorporation both of new 
regulatory and market developments. Limited evaluation of these programmes, has 
suggested they are successful within the industry itself, but there remains uncertainty 
concerning their reach, for example, to users outside the tight relationships within the 
industry (Walters 2008:143). Generally, work on the nature of inter-organisational 
relationships within the chemicals industry has highlighted the extent of integration 
that exists here and how it is governed by both the structure and the nature of the 
economic relations between customers and suppliers within the industry, the ways in 
which the development trust is supported in these relations and the role of individual 
‘boundary spanning’ agents in maintaining co-operative practices between 
organisations (see Marchington et al 2005: 135-156).  
 
This is an important point. The research literature on management more generally, 
when regarding supply chain relationships and the factors which influence them, 
draws a distinction between relations that are more transactional, and primarily cost-
based, and those which are more collaborative and incorporate a greater degree of 
financial mutuality (Espino-Rodriguez and Padron-Robaino 2006). Strongly cost-
based supply chain relationships have adverse implications for the employment 
conditions applying to those employed by lower level suppliers (Hunter et al 1996, 
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Scarborough 2000, Wright and Lund  2003). As James and Lloyd (2008) show, such 
conditions so negatively affected can include health and safety.  
 
The wider literature also indicates that the existence of a substantial degree of trust 
between the contracting parties is crucial to the establishment of collaborative types of 
arrangements and that this is most likely to exist where a good deal of mutual 
dependency and risk sharing exists, and where power is relatively evenly distributed. 
It further notes that there are contexts within which those at higher levels within a 
supply chain may choose to impose employment-related conditions on to suppliers 
lower down them as a result of ‘quality’ considerations; such as concerning the 
qualifications of staff and the training that they should receive (Swart and Kinnie 
2003, Kinnie and Parsons 2004). These are potentially beneficial in terms of health 
and safety but adverse implications can also arise — especially if these conditions are 
imposed on suppliers at the same time as strongly cost-based contracting practices 
(Beaumont et al 1996).  
 
Infrastructural support: There is also evidence that not only are the direct 
relationships between suppliers/users, customers/suppliers important locations for 
leverage to improve health and safety but that related organisations in their business 
environment may also be useful in this respect – as is the case described by Walters 
(2008), where a German paint suppliers’ association provides important supporting 
leverage to achieve the safe use of hazardous substances. This illustrates a further 
precondition likely to be important for the success of supply chain initiatives on 
health and safety. A well-established feature of German industry is its strong (and 
regulated) sectoral infrastructure. As Walters (2008) has argued, it is this feature that 
supports the inter-organisational arrangements for health and safety that are often 
apparent at sectoral level in Germany. In looser organisational contexts such as in the 
UK it is unlikely that such infrastructural support will be the norm.  
 
To sum up then, it seems that intervention in supply chain management to support 
health and safety can work under certain circumstances. However, three features 
emerge from this overview. First is the sense that the evidence of this is limited 
because very few initiatives have been subject to any rigorous evaluative scrutiny.  
Second is that despite this, the various examples corroborate one another in terms of 
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the ubiquitous presence of internal ‘regulatory’ arrangements whereby dependent 
actors in supply chains are, in one way or another, subjected to processes of 
supervision and control. The third striking feature of these accounts is that they 
seldom offer much inkling as to why the dominant players chose to take these 
initiatives to promote and support health and safety management amongst their 
suppliers in the first place and what it is that drives them to maintain the scrutiny most 
accounts deem necessary for their success.   
 
To answer this question Walters and James (2009) found it necessary to turn to 
literature on global supply chains and fair trading standards. Here, while drivers such 
as increased profitability and business efficiency, company reputational risk, and 
corporate social responsibility agendas, as well as compliance with regulatory 
requirements, are frequently cited by the heads of global supply chains as reasons why 
they subscribe to and promote fair labour standards, it is equally clear that awareness 
of the benefits of exerting such influence is not necessarily automatic on the part of 
the organisations concerned.  
 
A more comprehensive reading of the literature on market regulation — and 
especially that on global supply chains — suggests that a striking feature of this 
environment concerns the involvement of a range of actors, structures and procedures 
beyond the immediate supply relationship, that act —  or have acted  — in concert to 
prompt and sustain the desired effects concerning improved working conditions for 
vulnerable workers at the end of the chain.  For example in the global food, garment 
and footwear industries, the business case for supply chain controls to improve health 
and safety conditions in the supplying farms and factories of the southern hemisphere, 
does not emerge directly from the improvement of the health of the workers 
concerned— or even from the possible increased efficiency and quality achieved by 
this improvement. Rather, it comes from the potential for improvement in the public 
image of the client and the consequent selling potential of its ‘labels’ in northern 
hemisphere markets, which are otherwise threatened by bad publicity associated with 
exposure of poor conditions of labour in its supply chain.  
 
Such threats to business and the freedom of capital emerge from the effects of the 
concerted efforts of networks of social interest groups, organised labour, regulators, 
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media and so on. They are further sustained by alignments of mutual interests among 
trades unions, non-governmental organisations, labour inspectors, consumer and 
community action groups and others seeking to represent the interests of exploited 
workers, in negotiation and consultation with representatives of the companies at the 
heads of the supply chains concerned.  
 
The ‘ethical trading partnerships’ that result from such relations are further supported 
by various international bodies such as the ILO, WHO, donor agencies and NGOs and 
also enjoy a degree of arms- length approval from associated governmental bodies.  
The consequences are seen, for example in the more than 1000 corporate codes 
detailing labour conditions for corporate suppliers estimated in a World Bank (2000) 
survey and the 98 per cent of the world’s largest 500 companies that are reported to 
have a code of ethics or similar (Wilson and Gribben 2000). They are also found in 
the flagship partnerships such as that between multi-national car manufacturer, 
Volkswagen AG, the ILO and the German aid agency GTZ aimed at the development 
of an international guideline for OSH and supply chain management (Fromman 2008, 
Kristjansdottir 2007). But as Rodriguez-Garavito (2003) puts it, the stimulus for their 
development is found in the efforts of interest groups to expose the abuses of labour 
conditions for workers at the base of global supply chains and spur the formation of 
transnational advocacy networks: 
 
‘….aimed at re-establishing the link, blurred by global outsourcing, between 
brands and retailers in the North and workers in supplier factories in the 
South.’  
 
Analysis of these interventions has led to the emergence of a theoretical literature in 
which they are regarded as part of a new form of global economic regulation which 
increasingly occupies the space between the perceived failure of state regulation and 
that of the market to achieve such ends in supply relations (see for example the work 
of Jessop (2002) Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) O’Rourke (2003), Weil and Mallo 
(2007) and others).  
 
This is not only something that applies in the global relations between labour and 
capital but as Arup et al (2006), Heckscher (2006) and others have noted, it also has 
66 
resonance much closer to home. As the power of organised labour to confront capital 
has been weakened by changes in the structure and organisation of production, other 
forms of social resistance have emerged within civil society. Often isolated, 
ephemeral and issue specific, their impact is usually limited, but occasionally, and 
especially when they act in concert they are able to mount a more formidable 
challenge and force business organisations to modify their commercial strategies. 
Thus, in some of the examples of direct supply chain effects on health and safety 
management previously cited, the high profile of the activities involved — such as for 
instance, in the construction of facilities to host major sporting events or to build new 
airports — has meant that trades unions,  environmentalist groups, victim support 
groups and others have been able to operate alongside state inspection agencies and 
persuade the heads of supply chains in the businesses involved to implement more 
rigorous health and safety standards in order to offset the reputational risks associated 
with very public evidence of the fatalities that could otherwise be anticipated on the 
construction sites in question. Thus, the significance for trades unions in influencing 
the terms under which the construction of sports stadiums and the like takes place, is 
that it results from their potential to act in concert with others to draw attention to the 
damaging effects on large contractor company reputations in such high profile 
situations, rather than stemming solely from their power in labour relations on 
construction sites. 
 
These observations are especially pertinent in relation to the potentially positive role 
of supply chains in the maritime industry. It is to this we turn by way of conclusion.  
 
Conclusions: the  relevance to the maritime industry  
 
At sea — as in other economic sectors — the predominant impact of increased 
business focus on supply chains is to worsen the conditions of labour (and hence 
health and safety) for seafarers, both because of the significance of current 
outsourcing and off-shoring strategies and because of the key position of the industry 
in terms of global supply chain logistics. However, there are also a number of supply 
chain based business strategies currently employed in the industry, that are analogous 
to those found to be helpful in promoting good health and safety management 
practices in other sectors. Based on the understanding of the wider supply chain 
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literature, I have argued that structural determinants of the nature of the business 
relationship in question — for example, the extent to which they are collaborative, 
trust-based and longer term, where the business interests of both parties are seen to be 
served well and where the risks to suppliers posed by their non-compliance are 
perceived by them to be high — are significant factors that help to determine the 
extent to which it may be possible for buyers to influence the health and safety 
practices of their suppliers, as are the institutional and regulatory contexts of the 
business relationship in question. This I would suggest, applies in the maritime 
industry as much as it does elsewhere.  
 
For example, a combination of procurement and rigorous monitoring/ inspection in 
relation to the operation of health and safety management systems is already imposed 
on large parts of the tanker industry that operate under contract to ‘oil majors’. As 
economically powerful purchasers of the services of tanker companies, the oil majors 
at the head of oil transportation supply chains are in a strong position to dictate health 
and safety management standards to their suppliers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this is what they do, and moreover, they inspect and monitor compliance quite 
rigorously, with the result that their demands are prioritised and implemented by the 
shipping companies involved. That they bother do so is also easily explained, by their 
high profile and the reputational risks to their business that are threatened by ship 
incidents that might arise from poor safety management.  
 
Other parallels potentially exist with direct supply chain effects found in other 
industries For example, certification processes adopted in the industry, whether they 
address the competency of individuals, the health and safety management practices of 
companies or the standards required for ship operation all have parallels with 
certification practices in land based industries in which supply chain leverage has 
been used to improve implementation. This is not to say that such practices 
necessarily have the same effects at sea, but rather to suggest that it could be useful to 
evaluate them in these terms in order to understand ways in which they might be 
made more effective. Equally, there are dangers within these practices. Over-
bureaucratisation, ineffective or inappropriate monitoring and inspection, victim 
blaming, falsification of records and other fraudulent practices are all frequent 
subjects of anecdotal accounts of what goes wrong with some of these procedures 
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when they are applied at sea. Again, this suggests a better understanding of the 
preconditions for their successful operation might be useful.  
 
A further point concerns the role of infrastructural support. As demonstrated in land-
based scenarios, strategies to improve health and safety management that utilise 
supply chains to do so, work best in longer term, trust based business relationships 
located within supportive infrastructures. Such support potentially exists within the 
maritime industry in the many groups and associations representing the maritime 
trade. However, it may not be recognised as such and its potential may not be 
effectively harnessed. Similarly there is a strong message here concerning the 
potential for concerted actions from social actors concerned with the safety and well-
being of seafarers including trades unions, charitable organisations, seafarers’ welfare 
groups, NGOs, as well as environmentalist groups and international bodies such as the 
ILO and IMO.  
 
Finally, one might ask why should we be bothered about all this? The answer would 
seem to lie in the fact that despite improvement, current mortality and morbidity 
records demonstrate that the maritime industry remains among the most dangerous 
economic sectors in which to work. Most health and safety analysts would agree that 
such dangers arise not only from the risks of the sea itself but also from the way in 
which work is conducted and as such, they are largely preventable.  At the same time, 
the industry has moved a long way from the reach of conventional regulation and 
presents an enormous challenge to traditional command and control approaches to 
achieve this prevention, protect workers and improve health and safety.  In this 
scenario, approaches that utilise other drivers that may exist within, and around, the 
business relationships that occur in the industry are obviously useful. If they can be 
shown be effective and if what makes them effective can be better understood, it 
might help to improve their application and evaluate the potential to transfer them to 
other parts of the industry. This would seem to suggest important lessons for a host of 
stakeholders in the maritime industry, lessons that could be gleaned from further 
research in this field.  
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Vessel Design and the Well-Being of Seafarers 
 
 
Neil Ellis 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Human beings now spend more time than ever indoors. However despite this , relatively little 
is known about the impact of the built environment on health and well-being, especially 
within the maritime sector. Studies that have been conducted onshore suggest that 
environmental and architectural features within buildings such as high noise levels, 
inadequate lighting, and poor quality materials/facilities may all negatively affect the health 
and well-being of those that live there. Many of these factors are those which a seafarer 
experiences daily. However, due to the remote and confined location they work within , there 
is little chance for respite from this environment. This paper reviews studies that have been 
conducted to date onshore, and looks at the implications they might have for those working at 
sea. It reflects the early stages of the development of a project which will ultimately consider 
changes that could be made onboard vessels in order to improve seafarer health and well 
being. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As a consequence of rapid industrialisation in the 20th century and the recent increase in 
employment in the white collar, service, and retail sectors, human beings now spend the 
majority of their lives indoors (Zimring, et al., 2005; National Research Council, 1981).  
Employees spend up to a third of their waking life in an office building (Neuner and 
Seidel, 2006; Zimring, et al., 2005; Conrad, 1988), and this seems set to rise as average 
working hours are on the increase, especially in Europe.  Not only is much of our 
working life spent in the indoor environment but, increasingly, so too is much of our 
home and leisure time (Samet and Spengler, 2003). As a species one might say that we 
are becoming more and more a “subterranean population”. 
 
For those onboard merchant vessels, there is little escape from the built environment, 
and the modern day seafarer frequently spends the majority of the day, both during 
work hours and rest periods, inside the structure of the ship, often for months on end. 
However despite this, relatively little is known about the effects of the built 
environment on health and well being (Zimring, et al., 2005), especially for those in 
the maritime environment.  
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What little is known about the effects of the environment ashore may have important  
implications for the seafarer, as many of the negative aspects of the physical 
environment identified onshore can also be seen aboard ship. For example, studies 
have shown that factors such as quality of housing (Evans, 2003), noise levels (Salyga  
and Juozulynas, 2006; Riediker and Koren, 2004), light levels (Kuller, et al., 2006), 
and colour schemes (Caspari, et al., 2006; Baglioni and Capalongo, 2002) may all 
have effects on health and well-being. Other studies have looked at indirect factors 
relating to the built environment and their influence on well-being, such as social 
networks (Hawe & Shiell, 2000; Kawachi, 1999; Kawachi, et al., 1997; Semenza et 
al., 1996; Berkman, 1995), social support (Evans, 2003) and crowding (Van de Glind, 
et al., 2007; Caspari, et al., 2006). Similarly there has been research in clinical 
settings, and the built environment is now increasingly recognised as of relevance to 
the therapeutic process (Van de Glind, et al., 2007; Caspari, et al., 2006; Tyson, et al., 
2002; Gross, et al., 1998). Factors such as aesthetically pleasing environments 
(Caspari, et al., 2006; Evans, 2003) arrangement of furniture (Evans, 2003), windows 
(Van de Glind, et al., 2007) light (Baglioni and Capalongo, 2002) and privacy 
(Nelson, et al., 1998) have all been shown to influence patients well-being and 
recovery from illness. 
 
Such factors equally impact upon seafarers, particularly as onboard they are 
effectively institutionalised with little opportunity to get away from the vessel.  
 
Although vessels are built for specific purposes, which inevitably places constraints 
upon design (Salyga  and Juozulynas, 2006), there is scope for some change which 
could beneficially impact upon seafarers. For example, accommodation and 
recreational facilities may be redecorated using more aesthetically pleasing colours, or 
facilities such as barbeques may be provided that encourage social interaction.  Such 
change can play an important role in buffering against the negative impact of the 
environment of a vessel, and may also help seafarers to relax and restore themselves. 
Indeed research shows that several properties of the environment may be linked to 
more or less effective recovery from cognitive fatigue and stress (Maas, et al., 2009; 
Kaplan, 1995). 
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Within this paper I will look at the land-based research that has been conducted 
relating to the built environment and its effect on health and well-being, and I will 
outline related implications for those who work on marine vessels. The possible 
impact of these factors will be illustrated, with some recommendations being made as 
to how accommodation and recreation facilities may be better designed or adapted in 
order to improve the health and well-being of those onboard. 
 
 
Defining Health and Well-Being 
 
Although ‘health’ and ‘well-being’ are everyday terms, defining them is actually very 
difficult, as definitions vary greatly depending upon context. In the past health was 
simply defined as the absence of disease (Emmet, 1991). However, nowadays it is 
seen as a more encompassing concept, including not only physiological well-being, 
but also psychological and social health. For example, the World Health Organisation 
(2009) defines health as, ‘a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’ (World Health Organization, 
2009).  Well-being is generally seen as a more cognitive and subjective concept, and 
is frequently measured simply by asking individuals about how they feel. For 
example, Oswald, et al., (1999) suggests that, ‘subjective well-being addresses how 
good an individual feels about his or her life at a given time, and this construct 
includes cognitive and affective components’ (Oswald, et al., 2007, pg 97). These 
definitions will be used as the basis of how ‘health’ and ‘well-being’ are understood 
within the context of the current paper. 
 
 
The Direct Influence of the Physical Environment on Health and Well-being 
 
As discussed in the introduction, there have been a number of studies which have 
looked at the link between the built environment and health and well-being. Although 
some of the studies onshore were conducted in a clinical setting they, nevertheless, 
demonstrate the influence of the environment on the individual, and thus may be 
relevant to discussion of the built environment onboard ship. These factors, as well as 
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ways in which they may be modified or adapted in order to improve the health and 
well-being of seafarers will now be discussed. 
 
Noise 
 
An obvious  factor that may have an effect on the health and well-being of seafarers, is 
noise. Ships are renowned for being noisy places, as Salyga and Juozulynas (2006) 
point out, ‘Noise and vibration as well as the continual rolling and pitching of the ship 
are constant problems’ (Salyga and Juozulynas, 2006, pg766). Not only may seafarers 
have to cope with continuous noise from engine and other machinery, they may also 
be faced with more distracting unpredictable noises, for example noise associated 
with cargo operations, or noise from hand tools in the course of routine shipboard 
maintenance. Although there is little information about the impact of such noise on 
those that work onboard, the affect of noise on well-being has attracted much 
attention onshore. For example, Reidiker and Koren (2004) suggest that, ‘even at 
moderate sound levels it can cause serious psychological, social, and bodily effects’ 
(Reidiker and Koren, 2004, pg194). Other studies have reported similar findings. For 
example, Stansfeld (1993) suggests that environmental noise exposure, i.e. noise from 
airports, may lead to increased psychological distress. 
 
In the case of seafarers, the negative effects of noise may be exacerbated by the fact 
that they live where they work, and not only are they exposed to such noise levels at 
work, but also during rest periods. This is important as noise has been shown to have 
a negative affect not only on well-being, but also on sleep quality (Riediker and 
Koren, 2004), which may lead to increased levels of fatigue.  
 
Light Levels 
 
Another factor relating to the built environment that may be of concern for those 
working at sea is light. The effect of light on mood and well-being are well 
documented, for example there has been much research into the reduction of light 
during short days of the year, know as ‘Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD)’, which 
has found that reduced exposure to light may cause depression, increased fatigue, and 
a lack of energy. For the seafarer, exposure to light will depend greatly on the 
 79 
department they work within as well as ship type they are serving on. For example, a 
junior engineer may spend much of his day under artificial light in the engine room. 
By contrast, an AB may spend much of his day on deck, exposed to natural light. 
Although the Merchant Shipping (Crew Accommodation) Regulations (1997) state 
that marine crew accommodation must be adequately lit by natural light, and defines 
‘adequately lit’ as enough light during day time to read a newspaper, simply meeting 
such predefined standards may not be enough. Research suggests that the affect of 
light is not straightforward, and that the amount of light required by individuals  is 
variable. For example a study of light and colour in the work environment found that 
amount of light had a significant impact on mood (Kuller, et al. 2006). Mood was 
happiest when light levels were seen by individuals to be ‘just right’, but declined if 
levels were perceived to be too high or too low. Other studies have found comparable 
results (i.e. Evans, 2003), in relation to daylight. Similar results have also been found 
in clinical studies. Caspari, et al., (2006) suggest for example that for patients light is 
important for recovery and rehabilitation, whereas for staff light levels influence 
health and well being.  
 
Although more research is needed into light levels onboard ship, there may be a 
number of small changes that may be made in order to maximise the beneficial effects 
of light. For example fitting ‘daylight’ bulbs rather than neon strip lights may make 
the environment more naturalistic and pleasant. Lighting systems in areas such as 
accommodation and recreation may also be adapted so that they may be adjusted by 
individuals and set to levels that are seen as appropriate by them, for them. 
 
The View From The ‘Window’ 
 
Whilst the effects of light and noise on wellbeing are generally fairly well known, one 
factor that has been found to be linked with health and well-being, which may come 
as more of a surprise is the provision of, and proximity to, windows. Although on the 
face of it, this may seem to be associated with light, the relationship is not considered 
to be so straightforward. Research suggests that the importance of a window relates to 
the ‘view’ from it, rather than just the amount of daylight it delivers (Kuller, et al., 
2006).  
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The impact of a view on health and well-being is well documented. A number of 
studies have found that views of nature can be seen to have positive effects on well-
being (Van de Glind, et al., 2007; Evan, 2003). Similarly, the distance an office 
worker is seated from a window has also been shown to relate to mood (Kuller, et al., 
2006). For the seafarer, this paints a poor picture, as it is not uncommon for a 
seafarer’s view from their cabin to be of a stack of containers or machinery on the 
deck.  
 
Aesthetics 
 
Through research that has been conducted onboard vessels within SIRC it is apparent 
that an area of the modern ship that often seems to be ignored or overlooked in terms 
of vessel design and management is that of aesthetics, specifically within 
accommodation and recreational areas.  These areas are frequently furnished with 
dark colours, with little scope for personalisation, or modification, and colour 
schemes are often continued throughout the whole vessel, with little distinction 
between work and rest areas. Although such considerations may not seem important, 
especially as a vessel is primarily a place of work, studies looking at factors, such as, 
the colour of walls or the decor have shown that aesthetically pleasing surroundings  
may have important effects on well-being, mood and behaviour (Kuller, et al., 2006; 
Caspari, et al., 2006; Baglioni and Capalongo, 2002). For example, Caspari, et al., 
(2006) in a review of the strategic plans for the aesthetics of hospitals suggest that, 
‘dark and gloomy colours can lead to an analogue state of mind, whereas gaudy 
colour can lead to irritability, aggressiveness, increases in blood pressure, and a 
general feeling of unpleasantness’.  More generally they suggest that high quality 
working conditions reduce stress factors, strengthen immunity, and heighten the 
contentment factor’ (Caspari, et al., 2006, p856-857). Similar results are also found in 
non-clinical populations.  Kuller, et al. (2006) found that the use of good colours in 
the work environment served to improve the mood of staff.  Whilst Guite, et al. 
(2006) in a non-clinical population found that poor quality housing was associated 
with poor mental health.  
 
These studies indicate that the aesthetics of a vessel whilst largely ignored may 
actually have a real impact on the well-being of those that work onboard. Positive  
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changes to the aesthetics of the environment may be relatively easily to undertake, for 
example, accommodation facilities may be refitted using more aesthetically pleasing 
colours in order to make them more stimulating and inviting areas to live and work in. 
Efforts may also be made to vary the use of colours so that work areas and 
accommodation and recreation facilities are visually distinct, re-enforcing the 
boundaries between work and rest.  In relation to the quality of soft furnishings 
(including carpets and curtains) more attention could usefully be paid to cleanliness 
and maintenance. 
 
Confinement 
 
Before we look at social factors which are effected by the built environment are a 
final factor that we will look at, which has attracted much attention in the literature is 
that of (over) crowding.  Research into crowding ashore suggests that it may cause 
psychological stress (Evans, 2003), and similarly in clinical studies it has been found 
that crowding is associated with increased anxiety and poor socialisation (Hellman, et 
al., 1985).  
 
Although crowding per se, may not be a problem for those working at sea, especially 
in light of the current trend to crew at near minimum levels, ships are confined spaces, 
and seafarers have little access to open spaces, with few chances to go ashore.  The 
constrained lay out of the vessel also means that they have little private space. 
Therefore, seafarers may be seen in some respects, which are worthy of further 
exploration, to experience similar issues to those in crowded buildings. 
 
 
Indirect Influences of the Physical Environment on Health and Well-being 
 
So far the physical features onboard vessels that may have a direct influence on the 
health and well-being of those living and working there have been considered. 
However, it is also interesting to look at the interaction between the built and the 
social environment onboard. Ships should not simply be seen as geographical areas, 
they are complex spaces in which people conduct their lives (Neuner and Seidel, 
2006; Airey, 2003; Hancock, 2002; Baldry, et al., 1997).  
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The physical features of the ship  environment may indirectly affect health and well-
being through their impact on other factors such as socialisation, social support, and 
restoration (Neuner and Seidel, 2006). It has been argued that ‘there is an association 
between features of the environment and perceptions of neighbourhood social 
functioning that may indirectly influence health outcomes. Therefore changes in the 
urban design may influence health and well-being’ (Cohen, et al., 2008, p206).  
 
Social Networks 
 
One of the things said to be beneficial to health and well-being and also argued to be 
effected by the built environment is the capacity for social networks to develop. 
Cotterell (1996) defines social networks as ‘the structures and sets of relations found 
in an individual’s social landscape’ (Cotterell, 1996, pg14), and research suggests that 
there are a number of factors relating to the physical characteristics of the 
environment that may prohibit or encourage the development of these.  
 
One such factor is the provision of, and access to, public gathering places.  This has 
been shown to facilitate the formation of social networks, which may have a positive 
impact on mental and physical health (Maas, et al., 2009; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 
2003; Hawe & Shiell, 2000; Kawachi, 1999; Dalgard & Tambs, 1997). However, my 
experience from research onboard suggests that there is often little ‘public’ or shared 
space (i.e. recreational spaces) which is not deemed to be a work space. In some 
cases, even when public or recreational space is available, it is used for other 
purposes, for example, storage. When there are shared spaces onboard, such as mess 
rooms, these are often solely available to particular ranks, and thus may not facilitate 
whole crew interaction. This may not only lead to difficulties in building relationships 
onboard, but also in some cases isolation (Sampson and Thompson, 2003).  
 
Although it may be challenging to alter the amount, and nature of public space 
onboard, studies do suggests that interaction within such spaces as are available may 
be encouraged by the introduction of ‘activity generators’ such as food (Evans, 2003) 
and the arrangement of furniture (Tyson, et al., 2002; Baldwin 1985; Melin & 
Götestam 1981). For example, the provision of barbeque facilities could encourage  
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crews to get together in order to celebrate national events, or individual milestones, 
such as birthdays. However, research does suggest that social interaction should not 
be forced, and that people should be able to decide whether they participate in such 
activities or not (Evans, 2003). The fact that the mess rooms are often the only public 
spaces onboard (Sampson and Thompson, 2003) may mean that it may be very 
difficult for seafarers to choose whether they participate in such activities, especially 
if they are organised by a senior officer, as there may be seen to be an expectation for 
all crew to participate.  
 
Social Support 
 
Another social factor argued to be effected by the  built environment is that of social 
support (which is related to social networks). Cohen (2004) defines social support as, 
‘a social network’s provision of psychological and material resources intended to 
benefit an individual’s ability to cope with stress” (Cohen, 2004, pg 676). The 
possible link between levels of support and health and well-being is well established 
(see Chan and Lee, 2006; Franzini, et al., 2005; Berkman and Syme, 1979), and 
research shows that there are a number of factors within the built environment that 
may influence the amount of support that people provide to one another. For example, 
although the impact of noise on those onboard vessels has already been discussed in 
relation to its direct effects, exposure to noise may also indirectly affect health and 
well-being through its influence in the amounts of social support offered by seafarers 
to other seafarers.  For example, exposure to noise has been shown to interfere with 
communication and can cause irritability, which subsequently leads to people offering 
less support (Cohen and Spacapan, 1984).  
 
Onboard there may be a number of situations where noise could be seen to inhibit 
communication, for example, a noisy engine room or machine space may severely 
affect the ability of people to communicate with one another. Although it may be 
argued that such areas are places of work, the benefits of conversation during work 
can be easily seen: conversation often makes a long and tedious job more tolerable, 
and allows good and supportive friendships to be established. 
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For the majority of us social support is usually provided by family members and 
friends (Chan and Lee, 2006). However, unsurprisingly for those at sea the ability to 
communicate with those at home is often severely restricted (Sampson and 
Thompson, 2003; Thomas, et al., 2003). Such communication difficulty is not only 
due to the physical remoteness of the vessel, facilities such as telephone and internet 
access are often unavailable or severely restricted onboard. Even when such services 
are available they are often costly, which may be a particular problem for those is the 
poorer paid lower ranks. 
 
Restoration 
 
The final issue I am going to consider is ‘restoration’, and this is probably the most 
important in terms of those working at sea. Restoration refers the ability to recover 
from physical demands and psychological stress. Seafarers are often subjected to long 
hours, irregular shift patterns, and quick turn around times which are suggested to 
result in high levels of fatigue (Allen, et al., 2005). Thus the ability to recover from 
such demands quickly, and effectively, may be imperative. 
 
A number physical properties of the environment have been linked to restoration, and 
recovery from fatigue and stress (Maas, et al., 2009; Kaplan, 1995), as well as 
physical recovery in a clinical setting (Van de Glind, et al., 2007; Caspari, et al., 
2006). Many of these have previously been discussed in relation to direct 
environmental influences on well-being,  for example, exposure to nature has been 
found to positively relate to recovery from stress and fatigue (Maas, et al., 2009; 
Kaplan, 1995). Similarly aesthetically pleasing surroundings’ have been shown to 
increase recovery rates from mental fatigue (Evans, 2003). Within a clinical setting 
light levels have been found to be important in the recovery and rehabilitation of 
patients following surgery (Caspari, et al., 2006). 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Although this paper reflects only the very early stages of the work that is being 
conducted, it does draw together findings from a wide range of studies onshore that 
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have looked at how the built environment affects the health and well-being of those 
residing within it. Although these factors were identified through research onshore, they 
can be seen to have direct relevance to the seafarer as there are many parallels to the 
environment onboard ship. Indeed, they may be of greater importance to the seafarer as 
compared to their onshore counterparts, because for seafarers there is little respite from 
any negative effects of the environment of the ship.  
 
Although the layout of a vessel is fixed and relatively unchangeable due to the specific 
function that a vessel performs (Salyga and Juozulynas 2006), there is some scope for 
modification of the built environment which can be easily, and cheaply, made. For 
example, looking at easily changeable aspects of the environment, cabins and recreation 
rooms could be decorated using more positive colours and colour schemes and facilities 
and furnishings could be kept well maintained. Adjustable (dimmer switch) lighting 
might be introduced into accommodation areas and ‘daylight’ bulbs could be utilised in 
relevant areas of ships.  In reference to the social environment onboard, karaoke 
machines and barbeques might be provided in order to encourage crews to interact 
more in such shared spaces as are available. Such changes to the physical environment 
whilst being relatively inexpensive may have positive influences on those that work and 
live within it.  
 
Such efforts to improve the environment and consequently the health and well-being 
of the crew, may also have positive financial implications for ship-owners. Whilst 
modification of the environment may not be expensive, repatriating seafarers due to 
ill-health may be costly.  Ashore it has been argued that “workers experiencing poor 
health and well-being in the workplace may be less productive, make lower quality 
decisions, be more prone to be absent from work” (Danna and Griffin 1999, pg 358). 
There may also be other consequences of ignoring the impact of the built 
environment. For example, research into restoration suggests that a poor built 
environment they may drastically reduces seafarers’ ability to recover from the 
demands of the ir jobs, which may ultimately lead to fatigue. Therefore the design of 
accommodation and recreational faculties should be seen not just an issue relating to 
seafarers health, but also one that may indirectly affect ship operators as a result of the 
impact that such things have on work performance and the related possibility of 
accidents. 
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To date research in this area within the maritime industry is very limited, and the 
review of onshore research presented here only illustrates the possible factors that may 
be relevant within the maritime industry. This paper presents the beginning of a project 
and which is being conducted by the Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Research Unit 
(LRETRU).  As the research develops further findings will be made publicly available.  
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Training and Technology: Potential Issues for Shipping 
 
 
Lijun Tang 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Following a review of the literature on training and ICT implementation in various 
organisations, and preliminary analysis of a pilot study on training in shipping, this 
paper draws out some potential issues for shipping with respect to training and 
technology. The issues considered include: the acquisition of skills; motivation; and 
constraints on learning.  
 
Key words : technology, training, shipping, motivation, knowledge transfer 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past century, a large number of technologies have been introduced onboard 
ships (Winbow, 2002), for example, radio-navigation, radio-communication, 
electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS), automatic identification 
system (AIS), computer technology, and automation. New technologies offer a range 
of benefits. They help to increase productivity via the facilitation of reductions in  
crew size and turnaround times (Sampson and Wu, 2003). They also have ‘the 
potential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of watchkeeping and to improve 
the safety of operations’ (IMO, 2003). Furthermore, new technical developments, for 
instance, electronic fuel injection (EFI) systems, can both reduce costs and protect the 
environment.   
 
To reap the benefits of new shipboard technology, however, its users – seafarers – 
need adequate training. A quick search of Maritime Accident Investigation Branch 
(MAIB) reports suggests that inappropriate use of shipboard technology due to poor 
training can cause accidents. Lack of familiarity with the shipboard ECDIS equipment, 
for example, has been a contributory factor in a number of accidents, including the 
groundings of Pride of Canterbury and CFL Performer (MAIB, 2008a; 2009). 
Similarly, the inappropriate use of ARPA radar was identified as a factor leading to 
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the collision between Costa Atlantica and Grand Neptune (MAIB, 2008b). In another 
incident where the vessel Prospero made contact with a jetty, ship officers’ 
inadequate knowledge of the vessel’s podded propulsion system was found to be a 
causal factor (MAIB, 2007). A number of recent studies have likewise found that 
seafarers appear to be insufficiently familiar with/trained in the use of the new 
shipboard technology AIS which may lead to the transmission of erroneous AIS 
information (Bailey, 2005; Bailey et al., 2008; Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007; Norris, 
2007). Inaccurate AIS information can mislead seafarers when making collision 
avoidance decisions, and thus may have serious consequences.  
 
Researchers, commentators, and policy makers have unanimously pointed out that 
training on new equipment is essential to avoid similar accidents in the future (Bailey, 
2005; Gray, 2008; Grey, 2008; Hadnett; 2008; Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007; IMO, 
2003; Lloyd’s List, 2007; Norris, 2007). With more and more sophisticated 
instruments introduced onboard ships, it is suggested that adequate training and ample 
familiarisation time are crucial for seafarers to acquire competence in operating them. 
Commentators also point out that seafarers need to be made aware of the limitations 
and potential errors of technologies. Further, Bailey (2005; Bailey et al., 2009) argues 
that training needs to take into account not only the operation and limitations of 
equipment, but also how the introduction of new equipment can potentially modify 
shipboard practices. 
 
Thus, it is important to look into training provision and practice in shipping in order to 
improve it. This paper reports the preliminary findings of a pilot study on training and 
technology. It draws out potential issues for shipping in the light of these findings and 
also with reference to previous research undertaken in other sectors. The pilot study is 
part of a large on-going project which looks at seafarers’ adaptation to, and training 
on, new technologies. The first part of the project which focussed on AIS when it was 
first introduced onboard ships has been completed (Bailey, 2005; Bailey et al., 2008). 
This pilot study prepares for the next stage of the project - a large scale survey 
examining seafarers’ training on new shipboard technologies/equipment in general. It 
aims to identify issues that will be explored in detail in the survey. As part of the pilot 
study, thirteen interviews were conducted in the UK, two with college lecturers and 
eleven with officers undergoing training. Nine interviewees were deck officers, 
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including five chief officers and four 2nd officers. The other two were engineers, one 
3rd engineer and the other 4th Engineer. The officers were asked about their training on, 
and experience with, onboard technologies, while the lecturers talked about the design, 
provision, and forms of training courses.  
 
 
Acquisition of skills  
 
Research on training and ICT implementation suggests that end users in general 
acquire ICT knowledge and skills from four sources: vendors, companies, colleges, 
and themselves (Benson, 1983; Nelson et al., 1991). Vendors, companies and colleges 
provide formal training which is structured, institutionally sponsored, explicitly 
planned and organized, led by instructors, and associated with assessment and 
evaluation. By contrast, self learning is informal. It is not institutionally planned but 
individually initiated in everyday life (Conlon, 2004). Informal learning activities can 
take the form of self-directed reading, experimenting with new equipment, and 
observing and/or consulting colleagues (Aiman-Smith and Green, 2002; Spitler, 2005).  
 
Similarly, our interview findings suggest that seafarers acquire their skills with new 
equipment both formally and informally. Formal training is normally provided by 
external experts including training institute lecturers, company trainers, and 
equipment providers. User manuals, company circulars, and experienced colleagues 
onboard may help seafarers to acquire skills informally. 
 
When the technology is simple, seafarers are likely to be left to their own devices and 
acquire skills by reading user manuals and in some cases with the aid of company 
circulars. Some deck officers learned to operate AIS in this way. Several interviewees 
mentioned explicitly that formal training for AIS was not necessary because it was 
simple. One second officer explained how he learnt to use AIS by referring to 
manuals and by a process of ‘trial and error’:  
 
Just by reading manuals and trying it yourself.  It is like a new phone, if you 
know the basic operation of a phone, for example, off the hook means you have 
to call, and cancelling the call is the red button, then you can slowly, slowly 
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learn from using it.  Or maybe if you find a new button, “Oh, what is this?” 
Then you just refer to the manual.  That’s how, especially with the AIS, and I 
don’t think there is any course for it.  There may be a course, but it’s not very 
necessary, it’s just a piece of small equipment.  I learned it just by looking at the 
operator’s manual and just physically doing and checking and that is all. 
 
It is pointed out by IMO (2003), however, that technical manuals can constitute poor 
training material. One reason may be that consulting manuals takes time as the above 
quotation suggests. Furthermore, it may not be appealing to read manuals, especially 
when they are not written in seafarers’ first languages and/or when their quality is 
poor. IMO (2003) suggests that computer based training (CBT) is a better training 
approach. Compared with manuals, CBT seems easier to follow, and it may demand 
less time and effort from seafarers. Interestingly, none of the interviewees mentioned 
the use of CBT in relation to new equipment, although CBT has become a common 
training strategy in the shipping industry (Ellis et al., 2005).     
 
Previous research relating to training and ICT implementation suggests that peers play 
an important role  in the learning process (Gallivan et al., 2005; George et al., 1995; 
Lambrecht et al., 2004; Spitler, 2005; Winter et al., 1997). In organisations, there are 
‘resident experts’ (Nelson and Cheney, 1987) or ‘master users’ (Spitler, 2005) who 
are ICT users with advanced skills. They often give in situ help to users who are 
experiencing problems (Spitler, 2005). It is noted that the most common way for users 
to solve ICT related problems is to talk with colleagues close by (Lambrecht et al., 
2004). More significantly, obtaining information from peers with technical expertise, 
rather than via formal training, has been found to be closely related to end users’ 
computing skills (Winter et al., 1997).  
 
Onboard ships, seafarers also transfer knowledge and skills to each other. Learning 
from manuals takes time as suggested earlier. To learn quickly and with less effort, 
some seafarers opted for advice from experienced peers. The 3rd engineer interviewed 
explained how he learned the principles regarding the operation of Dynamic 
Positioning Systems (DPS) from senior engineers onboard:  
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Well, sitting down with the chief engineer and the second engineer, and we 
might drink coffee in the engine room, I can ask them [the principles], but we 
talk while we drink coffee. And that’s the whole idea behind it.  Plus the fact 
that as we use the equipment, the new guy kind of gets walked through and 
shown how everything operates.  
 
Experienced colleagues can answer questions directly, which helps less experienced 
seafarers to avoid the trial and error process. Furthermore, peers are able to transfer 
knowledge which is not in manuals but acquired through long-term experience.  
 
Knowledge transfer from senior officers to juniors not only helps the latter in the 
current job, but also prepares them for the future ones. One second officer mentioned 
this point in the interview: 
 
If the company want to promote a second officer to a chief officer, then that 
second officer, when he’s onboard, should be able to learn [how to use the 
shipboard loadicator]. The company will not provide onshore training.  Suppose 
I want to get promoted, I will ask my ex-chief mate or master, whoever, “teach 
me this.”  …   
 
The seafarers we interviewed tended to suggest that formal training is necessary when 
new equipment is complicated. This view concurs with research finding in other 
industries which suggests that complex technology creates high “knowledge barriers” 
and that only formal training can provide users with the requisite knowledge to 
overcome the barriers (Robey et al., 2002; Sharma and Yetton, 2007). Amongst 
seafarers, formal training was reported to be delivered by external experts either from 
training institutions, equipment manufacturers, or in-house training departments. 
Compared with user manuals which detail operational procedures, training 
programmes also explain the theory behind equipment, the limitations and error 
sources. Furthermore, being delivered by experts, it was said that training opens 
trainees’ eyes to the full potential of new technology. One chief officer reported the 
benefit of formal training as follows: 
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[The training] gives us a good knowledge about certain things, even if you’re 
using equipment for a period of time.  Maybe we are not using it to its maximum 
potential.  And because, okay, we may risk following a set pattern, I just use the 
equipment for whatever information I need or whatever I need to use.  But 
maybe I don’t want to try to find out what else it can do.  But once we go back 
to college or a training centre, you know that’s where we can get to know about 
more what it can be used for.   
 
Another advantage of formal training is that it corrects misconceptions and the misuse 
of equipment militating against the transfer of bad practice from peer to peer. One 
college lecturer recounted how in one training session one trainee realised that his 
previous usage of AIS was wrong and dangerous : 
 
Last week, we were putting the AIS on. One guy commented, “You know I use 
that all the time for collision avoidance.” Another guy said, “Well we’ve got a 
letter from the superintendent, it’s not to be used for collision avoidance.”  The 
first guy said, “No, I use it all the time.”  Now that was brought to us, and I said 
“Well you’re fighting on this, why your company sent out letters telling you not 
to use it?”  The second guy said, “It’s due to target swap.” So he explained to 
the first guy. You see him now, “Oh, I didn’t realise that.  I didn’t realise.”  
 
Though beneficial, formal training does not solve all problems ; and it arguably needs 
to be complemented by informal learning. According to research findings in other 
sectors, formal training only provides an initial and short stage in the learning process 
when new technology is first introduced (Spitler, 2005). In the on-going use of the 
technology, new problems will continue to crop up and users will need to consult 
colleagues, technical experts, and manuals, or go through other forms of informal 
learning processes in order to solve those problems (Lambrecht et al., 2004; 
Santhanam et al., 2007; Spitler, 2005).  
 
In shipping the issue of standardisation may make informal learning even more 
important. Onboard equipment is produced by different companies and therefore takes 
the form of different ‘models’ with different operational procedures. This places 
constraints on the onshore training provided by training institutions and/or company 
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departments, since the instruments in training centres may be different to those 
onboard ships. Therefore, training centres focus on the transfer of generic knowledge, 
which can be applied to different situations with the aid of operational manuals and /or 
experienced peers. One nautical college lecturer explained this point in the interview:  
 
We can teach generically the procedures of utilising the instrument, but you go 
on a ship and every ship has a different make of.  So it’s a different way of 
operating a system, say, GMDSS, of two different makers.  But your generic 
knowledge of how to do it, that knowledge will be enhanced by going to the 
manuals to see what buttons to press. 
 
These words indicate that formal training alone does not provide seafarers with 
adequate skills for the operation of new equipment due to the issue of standardization. 
When a well-trained seafarer joins a new ship, a process of familiarization is still 
required. He/she needs ‘old timers’ to pass on the relevant knowledge, and he/she 
may also need to refer to the manuals, in order to operate ship specific equipment.  
 
The issue of standardization may also make long-term onboard training less viable, 
especially for big companies, as one chief officer explained:  
 
Interviewer: Does the company ever send people to the vessel and give you 
courses onboard? 
Respondent: It really isn’t effective because with a fleet of 200 ships, you 
cannot get around everybody.  And in six months, the whole crew will be on 
different ships, different systems, so the best thing to do is a common course for 
everybody. 
 
Clearly a common course is a generic one which may not provide seafarers with ship 
specific skills. To acquire the latter, seafarers need informal onboard learning. 
 
The data indicate that onboard training was provided on some occasions. For example, 
manufacturers sometimes provided initial onboard training when new equipment was 
first installed on a ship. Sometimes companies were reported to send a technical 
officer onboard to provide training. In both cases, however, training can only be 
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provided to a few seafarers, who then pass on the knowledge to others. As such, the 
source of knowledge transfer quickly changes from external experts (formal training) 
to experienced peers (informal learning). 
 
The above discussions suggest that there are three levels of knowledge transfer (see 
Figure 1). The most basic level is self- learning by reading – knowledge transfer from 
written materials. It is most effective when technology is simple and straightforward. 
Since written materials do not respond to learners’ concerns, this level of knowledge 
transfer is a process of trial and error. When self- learning is combined with learning 
from experienced peers, knowledge transfer reaches another level – it is interactive 
and responsive, which, arguably, can be more effective and less time consuming. 
When the technology is complicated, knowledge transfer from external experts may 
be deemed necessary. Even when technology is simple, learning from external experts 
may have advantages, because experts have more knowledge of the full potential and 
limitations of the technology.  
 
Figure 1: Three Levels of Knowledge Transfer1 
 
 
1 Computer based training (CBT) is not considered here because none of the interviewees mentioned it. 
Nevertheless CBT and other forms of video training seem to be common. If they are to be added to the 
model, they could be situated in between ‘experienced peers’ and ‘user manuals/company circulars’, 
since they provide a sense of interactivity.    
External 
Experts 
 
Experienced Peers 
 
User Manuals/Company Circulars 
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Constraints on training and issues of motivation  
 
To adopt new technology and to acquire relevant skills, individuals need to be 
motivated to learn. In other contexts, it is found that individuals are likely to have the 
motivation if they perceive the technology to be useful in helping them to achieve 
their goals (Davis, 1989; Davis et al., 1989; Zhao and Cziko, 2001). Our interview 
data indicate that this is also the case with seafarers: when they perceived that training 
was necessary for the ir careers for example, they expressed a willingness to attend 
courses. One chief mate reported that he was willing to attend some courses because 
they would give him confidence to do a proper job and help him with promotion: 
 
This [attending necessary training courses] is required for your promotion. One 
definitely would like to take the courses. … If there’s a certain area in which I 
feel weak. I feel that I could have definitely gone for some more intense training, 
because at the end of the day we’re masters, we’re going to take over the ships 
so we must be very, fairly confident. 
 
However individuals have different goals which may be mutually exclusive. If new 
technology helps them to achieve one goal but negatively affects others, they may not 
be motivated to learn (Zhao and Cziko, 2001). Research in other industries has shown 
that end users were reluctant to take ICT training if it demanded use of their own time 
even though ICT was useful for their job (Benson, 1983; Brand, 1997; Galanouli et al., 
2004; Monk, 2004; Valcke et al., 2007; Waite, 2004). In shipping, similarly, time 
imposes constraints. Formal training is likely to take place in training centres ashore, 
which means training is undertaken when seafarers are ‘on leave’. Several informants 
explicitly mentioned that they were unwilling to take training courses during their 
leave time. One chief officer, for example, stated: 
 
The human resource department arranges the courses and then the person 
involved has to go and attend courses.  But the hitch point is: when do they do 
these courses?  The courses are done in their time off.  … Now, how else in this 
world, people go for training courses on Saturday and Sunday?   I mean people 
who work Monday to Friday do not take training courses on Saturday and 
Sunday, do they?  They only do training courses on weekdays, when colleges 
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are running.  But for seafarers, they have to do all the courses possible when 
they come home on leave, which they earn after working four months or six 
months away from home at sea, and then the employers expect them to train in 
their time when they’re on leave, and then go back on the ship.  So that’s why 
you get rarely any seafarer volunteering to do courses and training to enhance 
their skills.  What they want is a decent piece of leave.  
 
In the case of onboard training when equipment is first installed, some seafarers may 
not even be able to attend due to time constraints. New equipment is placed onboard 
only when a ship is in port. At this time, however, seafarers tend to have busy 
schedules due to short turnaround times. As a result, not all seafarers can attend initial 
training given by the technician responsible for the installation. One chief officer 
recounted his experience: 
 
Informant: During my last assignment a piece of equipment was installed. We 
had it installed during cargo operations and the contractors came on.  When they 
were ready to start testing it and show it how it worked, because of busy port 
turnaround, we were only able to spare the second mate.  So he went up and 
found out how it worked.  As I say, during a busy port turnaround we weren’t 
able to spare anyone else, and another day we had to see what it does.  It was 
just a PC with a feed, it gets connections. What else does it get? I don’t really 
know what it gets, because I was the mate then, and that was the second mate’s 
gig.  It wasn’t so much safety equipment, not something I played about with a 
lot. 
Interviewer: So you personally never got any training on how to use it? 
Informant: No.  During this passage I would ask the second mate “So what does 
this do?”  Give me a quick rundown.  But it’s not a piece of equipment I used a 
lot, although I could use it to find out the weather and stuff.   
 
Thus, busy schedules in ports may negatively affect onboard training and seafarers’ 
knowledge of some pieces of new equipment. To what extent this is the case, however, 
remains to be more fully examined. 
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On some occasions, training not only demands seafarers’ leave time, but also their 
money. Formal training involves external experts and resources, and therefore incurs 
a financial cost. While well-established shipping companies were reported by some 
seafarers to be committed to training, one Indian second officer reported that one 
shipping company tried to transfer training costs directly to him: 
 
Once I was about to join one company, and they were paying very good, so I 
was planning to go to that company.  But then, the person in the office, he asked 
me “Do you have this course?”  Some bridge team management course.  I said 
no.  He said “You have to do that course.”  As a second mate I did not have to 
have that course, it’s not mandatory. …  So I said I don’t have that course with 
me.  He said “You have to do that course…  But our company will not pay you.  
You do it off your own.  Not a thousand, about  200 pounds in all, and when you 
do that course you can join us.”     
 
Of the eleven interviews conducted with officers, this is the only example provided 
where an officer was requested to pay for a training course out of his own pocket. 
However, eleven interviews is a small number and all of the interviews were done in 
the UK at a reputable maritime college. To what extent this practice exists around the 
world is therefore unknown and needs further consideration. 
 
In the process of our research, one seafarer refused the interview request because he 
perceived that the research would result in the recommendation that more training was 
required for seafarers which he said that he would have to pay for and give up his 
leave time for. This suggests that great numbers of seafarers may be reluctant to take 
more training because currently it often requires that they give up some of their leave 
time and they may also have to pay for it themselves. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, informal learning and peers play a crucial role in 
skill acquisition. The literature on training and ICT implementation suggests that 
learning is most effective when it takes place while doing the actual job in the 
presence of co-workers with whom to discuss problems and exchange insights and 
discoveries (Gallivan et al., 2005; George et al., 1995; Waite, 2004). Thus, a 
supportive environment, where peers exchange information, encourage each other to 
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use new technology, and actively provide useful guidance, can motivate individuals to 
learn necessary skills and to adopt the technology (Ertmer, 2005; George et al., 1995; 
Sein et al., 1987). 
 
Whether or not the onboard environment supports and encourages informal learning, 
however, has not been examined. There are a number of preconditions that need to be 
met to foster a supportive environment. Firstly, knowledge transfer between peers 
needs input from both ends: the provider must be willing and have the competence to 
teach, and the recipient must not be afraid of revealing his/her weaknesses. The extent 
to which these conditions are met onboard is a matter for further investigation. 
Secondly, when the relieved worker transfers his/her responsibilities to the newcomer, 
he/she also needs to take time and effort to transfer the basic knowledge of equipment 
operational procedures. Given the brief handover process due to fast turnaround, 
however, it is questionable whether there is sufficient time for this type of knowledge 
transfer. Thirdly, while seafarers can learn operational procedures from manuals, the 
latter may not provide sufficient information about the limitations on equipment usage. 
In this context, seafarers may need some sort of training, CBT for example, or at least 
the provision of company circulars to provide relevant information. Do companies 
provide this or other sorts of support? Do companies have policies to encourage and 
facilitate onboard learning? Such questions remain unanswered and need to be further 
investigated.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
New technologies have improved efficiency and productivity in shipping. Yet, they 
also have limitations and may be prone to technical error, which has safety 
implications. To reap the full benefit of new technologies and to avoid potentially 
negative effects, seafarers need training in order to acquire necessary skills. Through a 
review of the literature on ICT implementation and a preliminary analysis of a pilot 
study on training in shipping, this paper has drawn out some potential issues for 
shipping with respect to training and technology. 
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The literature suggests that while formal training is important for successful 
technology implementation, it is also crucial to create a supportive learning 
environment where peers exchange information, share experiences of using 
technology, and actively provide useful guidance to one another. The pilot interview 
data show that seafarers acquired their skills from three sources – user 
manuals/company circulars, experienced peers, and external experts – which imply 
three levels of knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer from written materials  is most 
effectively used when technology is simple and straightforward. When technology is 
complicated, knowledge transfer from external experts is arguably necessary. External 
experts may be assumed to have advanced technical knowledge and therefore are in a 
position to help seafarers use equipment to its full potential whilst retaining an 
awareness of its limitations. However, to convert the knowledge transferred from 
external experts into practical competence, seafarers may still need the help of 
experienced peers or manuals for the acquisition of practical knowledge, due to lack 
of equipment standardization.  
 
To develop competence, seafarers need to be motivated to learn. While perceived 
usefulness can encourage seafarers to take training courses and to learn, demands on 
their own time and money may discourage them from doing so. Research on other 
industries suggests that a supportive learning environment can also motivate 
individuals to learn. To what extent the onboard environment is supportive, however, 
has not been studied. In the large scale questionnaire survey we intend to explore 
these issues in detail.  Our findings will be reported in subsequent papers. 
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